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Abstract 
The theoretical field of crisis management has just been established and developed 
since 1970s and in the past three decades, most of such theories were western-oriented 
and US-dominated. Inspired by Huang, Lin and Su (Taiwan) and Lee (Hong Kong)‘s 
explorations of cultural context in crisis communication, this thesis applied crisis 
communication theories to governmental practices in the mainland China examining 
the relevancy between theory and practice in a non-western context. The thesis 
specially focused on crisis communicative strategies corresponding to responsibility 
attributions, discourse of renewal optimistically promoting hopes and multi-voices 
influencing information exchange and responsiveness in crisis communication 
dominated by an authoritarian government. Then the thesis studied via chaos theory 
by comparing communication in two public crises (the SARS epidemic and the 
Wenchuan earthquake) over an extended period and suggested that crisis 
communication practices in China were bounded by the political system. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
  The purpose of this thesis was first to present and integrate such core theoretical 
contributions as attribution theory, crisis communicative strategies, the post-crisis 
discourse of renewal and multi-voices in communication to form a framework of 
theories within crisis communications. Then the thesis turned to critically apply this 
theoretical framework in a Chinese context to examine how much these crisis 
communication standards were relevant in the Chinese society. The theoretical part 
started from crisis communicative strategies and discourse in governmental practices 
to chaos theory for further study on these practices in a broad perspective crossing an 
extended time series. Crisis communication theories were applied to analyze two 
Chinese crisis cases in a pattern-matching manner (Yin, 2009) where theoretical 
standards were used to categorize facts into various patterns. They were the SARS 
epidemic between 2002 and 2003 and the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. The research 
question was ―what crisis communication practices did the central government of 
China adopt and what might possibly stimulate such adoption‖?  
 
Crisis communication is multidimensional, involving various domestic groups at 
different levels. In this thesis, I plan to narrow down the study on the domestic 
communication at the state level dominated by the central government when 
attributions of responsibilities, crisis communicative strategies, the discourse of 
renewal and multi-voices in the communication are concerned. Analyses are carried 
out case-by-case respectively, and then a cross-case comparison will be presented to 
show the similarities and differences between the two cases. Based on these 
cross-case similarities and differences, chaos theory will be applied to analyze the 
crisis communication at a macro level including the government body and other actors 
in crises, such as NGOs and volunteers, to explain how these phenomena existed in 
the previous comparisons. Governmental crisis responses were usually authoritarian 
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and centralized. They were self-repeated fractals, in Murphy (1996)‘s words. When 
citizens participate in crisis management, there were unpredictable results due to 
communication difficulties. In Seeger (2002)‘s words, such results were strange 
attractors. After a crisis, the central government usually changed their policies and 
such changes were communicated in post-crisis periods possibly creating advantages 
for the next crisis handling. This process was called self-organization by scholars 
including Sellnow, Seeger and Ulmer (2002).  
1.2 Database 
  This study employed a case-study method to develop descriptions of the events. 
Information on cases was collected in three steps. First, specials (TV programs, 
websites, magazines, etc.) edited by academic centers and news agencies were used to 
chronicle the events during and after the respective crisis. Second, news reports, 
mostly from top-level official propaganda in China, were used as resources for event 
descriptions and strategy-making process. Third, a series of academic papers 
contributed by Chinese scholars home and overseas, as well as foreign observers and 
researchers, were selected for relevant analyses.  
1.3 Cases Background 
1.3.1 SARS epidemic 
  In November 2002, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) occurred in 
Guangdong, China and the first outbreak of this unknown epidemic took place in 
February, 2003. Later, SARS spread to Hong Kong and then to Hanoi, Singapore and 
Toronto with ―rapid increases in the number of cases‖ (WHO, 2003a: p. 1). On 
February 18, 2008, the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention declared 
that the causative agent of Guangdong‘s atypical pneumonia could be Chlamydia, 
even though local epidemiologists in Guangdong held a strong common belief that 
this could be incorrect (Tsinghua & Renmin, n. d.). In early April, a letter by Dr. Jiang 
Yanyong, a retired head of a Beijing-based military hospital, was exposed to unveil 
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the central government‘s concealment on the epidemical transmission (Pottinger & 
Hutzler, 2003; Rosenthal, 2003). However, the central government of China did not 
tell the real numbers of SARS probable case and death till April 20, 2003 (Tsinghua & 
Renmin, n. d.). The last probable case in China was reported to the WHO on June 3, 
2003, and the WHO‘s global advisory of not to travel to Beijing, the last ―epidemical 
center‖ in China, was dismissed on June 24. According to the WHO‘s summary based 
on data as of the December 31, 2003, the total number of probable SARS cases 
reached 8,096, where 774 ended in death. In China, the total number reached 5,327 
where 349 of the affected died (WHO, 2003b). 
1.3.2 Wenchuan Earthquake 
  At 14:28 on May 12, 2008, an earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale jolted 
Wenchuan (Sichuan), China, affecting 10 provinces ―covering an area of 500, 000 
square km (UN, 2008: p. 1).‖ At 16:40 on the same day, Primer Wen Jiabao flew to 
the quake-damaged zone to take charge of this crisis. In the two weeks after the 
Wenchuan earthquake, 130,000 military troops, police and other forces dispatched and 
engaged in the rescue and relief work. Numerous Chinese citizens participated in the 
crisis communication including informal and supplementary news reporting besides 
rescue and relief following. At 14:28 on May 19, exactly one week after the 
devastating earthquake, China held a nation-wide, 3-minute period of mourning for 
victims in this natural disaster. ―The earthquake left 88,000 people dead or missing 
and over 370,000 injured (UN, 2008: p. 1).‖ On September 04, 2008, the Chinese 
government confirmed that the total economic losses (direct) reached RMB845.1 
billion (Xinhua, 2008d), which was about NOK701.6 billion
1
. From 2009, May 12 
has become the ―Day of Disaster Prevention‖ in China (GOV, 2009a). 
  
                                                        
1 The exchange rate was about 1CNY=0.8303NOK on 04/09/2008. 
http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter#from=CNY;to=NOK;amt=8451  
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2. Theoretical Fundaments 
2.1 Definition of Crisis and Crisis Communication 
2.1.1 What is Crisis? 
Crisis is generally considered to be big troubles arising in an unthinkable or 
unpreventable way (Lerbinger, 1997). To be exact, a crisis is an event that greatly 
affects the normal internal system of an organization. And during a crisis, 
―fundamental principles of implicated subjects are questioned, altered, or even 
protected by newly created tacit defense mechanisms‖ (Elliott & Charlebois, 2007: p. 
320). This means, during a crisis, ―a decisive change is pending‖ (Winter & Steger, 
1998: p. 32). Furthermore, ―no active mechanisms within an organization or industry 
can be employed to regain its former condition, processes, or structure‖ (Elliott & 
Charlebois, 2007: p. 320). In Coombs (2007a)‘ words, a crisis ―can seriously impact 
an organization‘s performance and generate negative outcomes‖ (p. 2-3).  
2.1.2 What is Crisis Communication? 
In accordance with Fearn-Banks (1996), crisis communication is ―the 
communication between the organization and its publics prior to, during, and after the 
negative occurrence‖ and ―the communication is designed to minimize damage to the 
image of the organization‖ (p. 2). Crisis communication is of vital importance because 
―an immediate response is necessary‖ due to the ―looming threat‖ and situations 
which are ―inherently uncertain‖ (Ulmer, Seeger & Sellnow, 2007: p. 130). In a public 
crisis like a natural disaster, crisis communication enables the public to get important 
information on how to respond to crisis so that the loss could be reduced to a level as 
low as possible. Furthermore, effective crisis communication could create ―positive 
opinions among publics‖ (Sturges, 1994: p. 298) to the government and shape a risk 
perception with adequate information in a manageable way. In my opinion, proper 
crisis communication also evokes proactive participation from the public to overcome 
difficulties, together with the government. 
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2.1.3 Three Stages of Crisis 
  Crisis communication in fact is an ongoing circle which is not limited in the crisis 
period. In his book Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing and 
Responding, Coombs (2007a) divided a crisis period into 3 stages named pre-crisis, 
crisis event and post-crisis. Pre-crisis means signal detection, crisis prevention and 
crisis preparation. Crisis event ―begins with a trigger event that marks the beginning 
of the crisis‖ (p. 19) and consists of crisis recognition and response. Post-crisis is 
about what should be done when a crisis comes to an end. In this stage, it should be 
confirmed that the crisis is really over and the organization‘s crisis management 
efforts leave the public positive impressions while the organization starts better 
preparing for the next unexpected crisis. Finally, the post-crisis phase is actually 
―involved in the pre-crisis phase of crisis management‖ (Coombs, 2007a: p. 163). In 
this thesis, the stages of crisis event and post-crisis are highlighted. Crisis 
communication contents and crisis response in these two stages are specially selected 
to analyze the government‘s crisis communicative strategies.  
2.1.4 The Trend of Crisis Communication 
According to Lee (2005)‘s in-depth literature review, the research of crisis 
communication initiated from 1980s has gone through two stages. One is 
identification and analysis of crisis response strategies in particular crises (Allen 
&Caillouet, 1994; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000) and the other is the matching of 
characteristics of crises with crisis-response strategy selection (Coombs & Holladay, 
1996, 2001). In these two stages, the research of crisis communication limits its focus 
of theoretical framing on a very narrow separated unit of business and organizations 
(Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; Coombs, 2004, 2007a; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). 
Many theories concentrate on the communication between organizations and 
stakeholders where the government is generalized as some part of the latter. What is 
worse, the theoretical framework is heavily western-view-based. The field of crisis 
communication has been emerging since 1980s but it is still fragmented without a 
systematic framework in theory (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006; Lee, 2005). In this 
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section, a few theoretical contributions in different phases of crisis communication 
history are selected, presented and integrated in a cohesive way in order to lay a 
fundamental theoretical background for case studies in the third section. 
2.2 Crisis Attributions and Response 
2.2.1 Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory is connected to crises because attributions are made on the cause 
of a crisis and crisis responsibility is assessed (Coombs, 2007b). Crises are 
unexpected, unplanned and usually considered as terribly negative. However, a crisis 
might not be unexpected because it might be partly caused or dampened by certain 
preventable factors more or less. Therefore, people are eager to find out causes of a 
crisis (Weiner, 1985, 1986) and a crisis situation is thus evaluated. Based on such 
responsibility attribution, crisis response strategies are decided and adopted. 
Attribution theory therefore is linked to crises (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Jorgensen, 
1994, 1996; Stockmyer, 1996; Coombs, 2007b).  
 
Attribution theory guides people to judge on the bases of ―dimensions of locus, 
stability and controllability‖ (Coombs, 1995: p. 448). Locus means the locus of 
control. By defining locus, the crisis cause is judged as external or internal to the actor. 
Stability is regarded with whether or not the cause is coincident, occasional or 
variable. Controllability discusses about whether or not the cause of the crisis is 
within the actor‘s (the crisis-induced party) control (Russell, 1982; McAuley, Duncan 
& Russell, 1992; Coombs, 1995). For instance, if the actor‘s locus is internal while 
the controllability and stability are both high, then the attribution of the actor to the 
crisis is high. Once the actor‘s attribution to the crisis is perceived by the public to be 
high, it is commonly believed that the actor is largely responsible for the crisis 
because the crisis could be eliminated by the actor before breaking out. The actor is 
thus heavily accused, criticized and even punished.  
2.2.2 Affecting Factors on Responsibility Attributions of a Crisis 
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  The responsibility attributions of a crisis are affected by four factors—crisis type, 
veracity of evidence, damage and performance history.  
 
Coombs (1995) created a crisis type matrix by introducing external-internal and 
intentional-unintentional dimensions.  
 
Table 1: Crisis type matrix (Coombs, 1995: p. 455) 
 Unintentional Intentional 
External Ambiguity 
2
 Terrorism 
Internal Accidents Transgressions 
 
According to Coombs & Holladay (1996), ambiguity happens when an 
organization believes that its actions are appropriate while some external agents claim 
the opposite and challenge the appropriation. The standards for the action evaluation 
is ambiguous thus it is possible for each of the two sides to claim that they are right. 
Accidents are both uncontrollable and unstable. They are unintentional happenings 
during normal operations; no matter whether they are acts of God, like the Wenchuan 
earthquake, or human-induced errors such as SARS‘ accidental introduction from 
Guangdong to Hong Kong by a doctor infected by his patient (WHO, 2003a). 
Terrorism relates to intentional designs which directly or indirectly aim at harming an 
organization. It is beyond the organization‘s control or prevention and it is initiated 
and caused by an external force. Transgressions are committed when an organization 
takes internal actions even though it is well known that such actions would leave the 
public at risk (Coombs, 1995). In this case, the locus is internal and actions are 
controllable.  
 
Veracity of evidence is about the proof of a crisis event‘s occurrence (Coombs, 
1995). The public learn about the crisis from information and evidence collecting, 
                                                        
2 In the original matrix, this was called ―faux pas‖. In order to stick to English, here I change it into ―ambiguity‖ 
according to Coombs & Holladay (1996)‘s explanation saying that ―a faux pas is ambiguous as to whether or not a 
crisis exists‖ (p. 285).  
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selecting and analyzing. However, evidence could be true, incorrect or ambiguous. 
Then it is vital for the organization involved to tell and share the truth with the public. 
In the lack of veracity of evidence, rumors mounted up fast. They could be true or 
false but it is hard to tell or stop them because it is learned by the public as a 
substitute of true evidence which is concealed or undiscovered (Zhou, 2003). For 
example, rumors spread at the beginning of SARS outbreaks not only because of the 
fear from the public on the unknown epidemic but also due to the governmental denial 
and concealment of the truth.  
 
Damage includes: deaths, property loss, environmental harm, etc. The more severe 
the damage is, the more inclined the public are to blame the organization involved in 
the crisis because psychologically, people hold others (e.g. the organization) more 
responsible for negative actions than for positive ones (Griffin, 1994). In times of 
crisis, the public is grouped into victims and non-victims and the former ―want some 
forms of closure to a crisis‖ while the latter ―want assurances that the crisis will not 
affect other groups, especially themselves‖ (Coombs, 1995: p. 459). However, I 
would like to point out here that non-victims not only want the crisis not to affect 
themselves so that their self-interest would not be harmed, but they also expect ―some 
forms of closure‖ to the crisis and are willing to help the victim group out of 
difficulties by employing such means as donation and charity. For example, in the 
aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, the Chinese people and international 
community gave assistance to those unknown hit by the natural disaster. 
 
An organization‘s performance in history is declared as an influential factor in a 
crisis. It is commonly believed that if an organization holds a positive performance 
record in history, it could gains forgiveness from the public more easily than another 
with an infamous historical record instead (Barton, 1993; Coombs, 1995; Griffin, 
Babin & Attaway, 1991). If an organization is infamous for a negative performance 
history, then during a crisis, it encounters hardship to gain support or regain 
confidence and trustworthiness from the public because historically it is not ―good‖.  
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2.2.3 SCCT: Further Specifications on Crisis Types and Performance History 
Scholars are quite interested to prove that there is a connection between crisis types, 
performance histories and reputation-protected communication efforts. Situational 
Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is then driven upon experimental methods and 
social-psychological theory. It specially focuses on two affecting factors on 
responsibility attributions—crisis type and performance history. SCCT initiates an 
examination on the crisis situation to ―assess the reputational threat of a crisis‖ 
(Coombs, 2007b: p. 137). SCCT claims that different crisis types produce specific 
degrees of crisis responsibility which could also be estimated. The ―specific degrees 
of crisis responsibility‖ of an organization are in fact the attributions of organizational 
responsibility. When examining the crisis type, crisis responsibility and reputational 
threat could be assessed and posited. Coombs (2007b) claimed that three crisis 
clusters could be identified, 1) victim cluster like natural disasters; 2) accidental 
cluster such as technical-error accidents; and 3) intentional cluster including 
organizational misdeed. In accordance with these identifications, the crisis type of 
transgression is probably the most unforgivable among the four crisis types because it 
is not only within the intentional cluster but also internally caused. 
 
After the threat is assessed, factors of consistency and distinctiveness are analyzed 
by checking ―whether or not an organization has had a similar crisis in the past‖ and 
―how well or poorly an organization has treated stakeholders in other contexts‖ 
(Coombs, 2007b: p. 137). If an organization consistently has similar events or 
problems, then the consistency is high. Adversely, if an organization acts differently 
from before, then the consistency is low. When an organization has a negative 
reputation for treating stakeholders badly, then the distinctiveness is considered to be 
low. And the distinctiveness is high when an organization owns a reputational record 
on the relation with stakeholders. All these cause-and-effects are also valid when they 
are applied to the relation between a government and the public. Coombs (2007b) 
supposed that ―either low distinctiveness or high consistency will intensify 
attributions of crisis responsibility thereby indirectly affecting the reputational threat‖ 
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(p. 137). If the perception of an organization‘s responsibility attribution is high, then 
the perceived impact on the organization‘s reputation is also high, but in negative 
terms (Coombs, 2004).  
 
Founded on the attribution theory, crisis-response strategies have been discussed, 
learned, proposed, developed and categorized by various scholars including Benoit 
(1995, 1997) and Huang, Lin and Su (2005). 
2.3 Communication and Attributions of Responsibility 
2.3.1 Image Restoration Theory 
  The image restoration theory is built on an assumption that communication is a 
―goal-directed activity‖ with maintaining a positive reputation as one of its central 
aims (Benoit, 1995: p. 63). On the one hand, when communicating, people present 
messages with certain purposes, for example, to inform and/or to persuade; and they 
choose the way, which they believe or suppose, that can maximize the achievements 
of their goals. This explains the ―goal-directed‖. On the other hand, a positive 
reputation is highly necessary for an organization. From the internal aspect of an 
organization, a positive reputation contributes to a benign self-image and the 
attainment of such self-image has been postulated as one of the ―important 
motivational variables throughout the history of psychology‖ (Snyder, Higgins & 
Stucky, 1983: p. 29). In an organization‘s crisis communication, a positive reputation 
is a strong weapon of defense for it to empower and shape its image, credibility 
among and influence upon the public. Therefore, internally and externally, a positive 
reputation has certain nudging or seductive impact on the public‘s decision makings 
on advocating, ignoring or objecting the organization‘s activities. In other words, a 
positive image may win potential positive behavior (Coombs, 1999) from publics who 
are willing to devote support the positively-imaged organization. 
 
  The image restoration theory is related to responsibility attribution theory and ―the 
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core [of this theory] is a set of image restoration strategies‖ which ―can be used to 
rebuild the damage a crisis inflicts on an organization‘s reputation‖ (Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000: p. 165). Benoit (1995) grouped out five main strategies named 1) 
denial; 2) evading of responsibility; 3) reducing offensiveness of event; 4) corrective 
actions and 5) mortification. A bunch of scholars and researchers examined on 
crisis-hit organizations‘ narratives and deeds, then followed, developed and discussed 
on Benoit‘s five image restoration strategies, which later were enlarged and renamed 
as crisis-response strategies (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Hearit 1994, 1997; Marcus & 
Goodman, 1991; Coombs 1998; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). Huang et al. (2005) 
summarized a typology within which crisis response strategies are redefined as crisis 
communicative strategies (CCSs) and regrouped them again into 5 types. The authors 
explored a cultural implication (Chinese context) of such new factors as diversion and 
ambiguity. Therefore, I adopt their strategy categorization and will further explain the 
crisis communication strategies with their categories instead of Benoit‘s and 
accordingly compare the applications and relevancies of them in the two cases of the 
SARS epidemic and the Wenchuan earthquake. The theory of CCSs is used as a 
means to identify and exam which strategies were used in certain situations and to 
compare those different phenomena resulted in different situations.  
2.3.2 Crisis Communicative Strategies 
Using Huang et al.‘s model (2005), I introduce their five main strategies here, 1) 
Denial; 2) Excuse; 3) Justification; 4) Concession; and 5) Diversion.  
 
  According to Huang et al. (2005), Denial is a claim which denies the existence of 
the event/accusation in question. These scholars focus on simple denial only but I 
agree with Benoit (1997) that another sub-strategy of shift the blame should be 
categorized into this category as well. Benoit (1997) defines this sub-category as 
―arguing that another person or organization is actually responsible for the offensive 
act‖ (p. 180). This is also called scapegoating by Coombs (2007a).  
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  In the strategy of Excuse, the accused person or organization claims that he/she/it 
should not be responsible for the crisis because of uncontrollable factors. One of the 
sub-strategies in this category is defeasibility, which is a ―statement that claims that 
the actor [person or organization] did not have the knowledge, ability or control to 
avoid committing the offensive act‖ (Huang et al., 2005: p. 234). Besides defeasibility, 
provocation which says that the accused offensive act was a reasonable counterattack 
to the accuser‘s offenses and good intention which says that the questioned event 
happens with good intentions are also categorized into the crisis communication 
strategy of Excuse. 
 
  Justification implies that the standards used to evaluate the consequences of the 
event in question are not reasonable or appropriate, though the accused 
person/organization (the crisis-induced actor) might be partly responsible for the 
event. It includes such sub-strategies as bolstering, minimization, suffering, attacking 
accuser(s) and reframing. To bolster is to stress good traits and performance of the 
accused in the past (Benoit, 1997); to minimize is to persuade others that the act is not 
that offensive as it has been supposed to be; to suffer means the accused 
person/organization considers herself/himself/themselves as ―an unfair victim of some 
malicious, outside entity‖ (Coombs, 1995: p. 453); to attack accuser(s) is to confront 
the accuser(s) who claim that the accused is to blame for the act/crisis; to reframe 
means ―reframing the facets within the same issue but in a larger and more favorable, 
at least comparatively, context‖ (Huang et al., 2005: p. 234). This is also named 
―transcendence‖ by Benoit (1997: p. 181). 
 
  When apply the strategy of Concession, the accused admit his/her/their 
commitment to the event in question, confess and be willing to remediate and change. 
If the accused person/organization agrees on the occurrence of the crisis and 
apologizes for it asking for forgiveness, then this communication strategy is defined 
as apology, or the admission of fault. A further step could be done by compensating 
victims with money, goods and services to counter off their passive feelings towards 
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the accused. This is called compensation. The accused person/organization could 
adopt a third step by committing to repair the damage and restore the image or to 
prevent a repeat of the crisis. Such step is named corrective or proactive works. If the 
commitment consists of altering the organization‘s policy, then it is sub-grouped as 
changing public policy. Furthermore, instructive information which means people are 
taught to react when the crisis recurs is a practical step of corrective or proactive 
works. The last sub-group of the Concession strategy in Huang et al.‘s category (2005) 
is adaptive information which cares about psychological influences of the crisis on 
people and educates people to mentally adapt to the crisis. However, personally I 
suppose another step of internal scapegoating could also be added in the category. It 
originally means transferring the blame from the entire group to an internal subgroup 
of the accused (Brinson & Benoit, 1999). In this sub-strategy, the entity incompletely 
admits the commitment to a crisis by apologizing and correcting certain company 
rules concerned and policies but claiming at the same time that only some people in 
the group make the mistake and that the whole organization itself is not responsible 
for the mistake. 
 
  The final category of communicative strategies is Diversion. This group is 
characterized by ―creating a different issue or temporarily easing public anger by 
showing regards (while not apologizing)‖ (Huang et al., 2005: p. 235). The accused 
person/organization might state sympathy with no direct apology involved. Sentences 
like ―It is a great pity that…‖ are typical for such strategy. This is sub-grouped as 
showing regards/sympathy. Another subgroup called building a new agenda can 
switch or reduce public focus and media concentration on the crisis by creating a new 
issue which, in most cases, is little related to the current crisis. Differentiating tries to 
differentiate the act in crisis from other actions which are considered similar but more 
severe; then, comparatively, the crisis in question seems not that bad as estimated 
before.  
 
  To conclude, a table principally based on Huang et al. (2005)‘s categorization is 
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used here to summarize all crisis communicative strategies explained above. 
 
Table Two: Crisis Communicative Strategies (CCSs) 
No. Strategy Types Sub-strategies 
1 Denial Simple denial; shift the blame (scapegoating) 
2 Excuse De-feasibility; good intentions; provocation 
3 Justification Attack accuser; bolstering, minimization, suffering; 
reframing (transcendence) 
4 Concession Apology/admission of fault; compensation; corrective or 
proactive works; changing organization public policy; 
instructive information; adaptive information; internal 
scapegoating 
5 Diversion (cultural 
implication) 
Building a new agenda; differentiating; showing 
regards/sympathy 
 
  Finally, I must criticize here that from attribution theory to crisis communicative 
strategies, theories are developed one-sidedly for the purpose of protecting an in-crisis 
organization‘s interest. Attribution theory tells organizations how to assess their 
respective responsibilities in different crises and it ―serves as the basis for explaining 
the relationships between crisis-response strategies and crisis situations‖ (Coombs, 
1995: p.448). Communicative strategies are developed to guide the accused to 
―protect the image of organizations‖ (Huang, et al., 2005: p. 229). The destination of 
these strategies is to protect the self-interest of the accused (Xu, 2003). The interest of 
the others, including victims, is subordinate to that of the organization and serves as a 
means to fulfill the pursuit of the self-interest of the accused organization. However, 
crisis communication should serve more than image protection for and self-interest of 
an organization, especially in a public crisis. The end of crisis communication should 
be reduction of loss and protection of the interest of the whole society, including the 
organization and the public. 
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2.4 Discourse of Renewal in Crisis Communication 
  The discourse of renewal means rhetorically, an organization chooses and structures 
a reality in which a crisis response is focused on positively motivating individuals to 
rebuild the crisis-hit organization into a new and more advanced one. In the discourse 
of renewal, a crisis is an opportunity and ―an integral part of an organization‘s 
lifecycle‖ (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002: p. 365). Four characteristics of the discourse of 
renewal in crisis communication are explicated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
(1969) as follows, provisional communication, prospective outlook, optimistic focus 
and effective leadership.  
 
  Provisional communication stresses on rebuilding and focuses on the whole 
affected community rather than just favors a few (e.g. the organization itself). By 
representing the interest of a bigger group and involving in a larger extent of issues, 
provisional communication wins more advocates and compassion and stands longer in 
the test of time.  
 
  Furthermore, renewal discourse exhibits perspective arguments and persuasions on 
future actions which are assumed and modeled in a positive manner. This discourse 
explains ―what will happen and how the organization will move forward‖ (Ulmer et 
al., 2007: p. 132). It is immediate and it comes out before a complete solution is on 
the table, but a ―blueprint‖ in the communication discourse of renewal encourages 
certain particular types of acts and thinks as the organization estimates, or even more 
constructive.  
 
  An optimistic focus enables an organization to recognize and seize opportunities. It 
is believed that crisis could produce opportunity while introducing devastation. 
Chinese memorize this belief by making up the Chinese characters of crisis, weiji, 
with danger (wei) and opportunity (ji). Many scholars emphasize the terror of crises 
and study on how to escape from the following damages but others also describe and 
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search on crisis-created chances (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002; Seeger, 2002; Comfort, 
Sungu, Johnson & Dunn, 2001).  
 
  The renewal-discoursed crisis communication also relies tightly on leaders‘ prestige. 
Such communication encourages people to walk from the materialistic ruins and 
psychological shadow during the crisis event to the optimistic orientation to a 
post-crisis future. Thus leaders must utilize their reputation to inspire confidence on 
possible renewal realization they deliver in the discourse of renewal. They also 
instruct exemplary behavior for people to follow so that such behavior would be 
adopted (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Ulmer et al., 2007).  
 
  In what cases the discourse of renewal could be built up? A massive destruction 
could bring needs of renewal. For example, a natural disaster provides context and 
space for renewal because buildings are destroyed and latent problems, such as 
system shortcomings, are exposed. Nevertheless, a renewal discourse needs more to 
become established after a disaster. Two types of commitments are needed. The 
commitment from the non-victim party (the public or the unhurt part of the public) 
supports the victim party (the crisis-trapped people) to rebuild. Victims need to 
reconstruct and they would finish the reconstruction more quickly and more 
efficiently on condition that supplementary aids from non-victims could be pooled 
and channeled to them. The other commitment is about corrective and proactive 
changes from the victim party. The victim party should communicate to the 
non-victim party promising that it would reduce damage, rebuild the ruined and 
correct crisis-inducing problems in which manners meanwhile acting quickly to 
illustrate the determination and fulfill promises it presents in the previous 
communication. Core value is another basis for renewal in crisis communication 
(Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). During a crisis, causations are questioned, preventions are 
discussed and previous practices are altered. All these ultimately point out a unified 
―core value‖ such as humanity and patriotism. This value could be shaped rhetorically 
by the victim party to guide the non-victim party‘s behavior and to increase the 
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commitment from them.  
 
  Concerning the discourse of renewal, the four characters of provisional 
communication, prospective outlook, optimistic focus and effective leadership 
proposed by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) are used as standards. And then 
based on Ulmer et al. (2007)‘s three conditions on building up the discourse, the two 
cases are examined and compared. 
2.5 Multi-voices in Crisis Communication 
  The idea of multi-voices in crisis communication comes from postmodernism. In 
arguments of Lyotard (1984) and Berquist (1993), postmodernism discredited and 
abandoned standardizations and universalizations. It suggested multiple narratives. 
Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998) went further by suggesting that postmodern crisis 
communication emphasized competing narratives. Venette, Sellnow and Lang (2003) 
proposed to examine crisis communicative strategies as different competing narratives 
from the media and the organization in question. In a Chinese context, it might 
become examinations on crisis communicative strategies as different competing 
narratives from ―the official narrative of the government and rumors among the 
public‖. Tyler (2005) further explained that a crisis often disrupted ―the dominant 
narrative about itself that an organization attempts to maintain‖ and it might ―open 
that official narrative up to public contest‖ (p. 567). Crisis communication should not 
merely focus on how to quickly regain control because the whole process was not 
linear, tidy or step-by-step. Variables in a crisis usually might produce unexpected and 
chaotic turning points. Martin (1990) and Hazen (1993) recommended that voices of 
the disempowered and marginalized should be listened. Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) 
also advocated that other constituencies‘ participations in crisis communication might 
increase the effectiveness in image repair efforts. 
 
When a crisis breaks out, various mixtures of truth, lies, assumptions and 
hypotheses are in abundance. In some cases, the official stories might be described as 
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―merely the viewpoint of some dominant groups in society and should not be 
privileged over another viewpoint‖ (Holtzhausen, 2000: p. 96). The view point of 
some dominant groups is just part of the truth and voices from the grassroots in 
different ethnics, classes and regions should not be marginalized or dismissed. In 
other cases, it is not abnormal in a country that those in power always determine what 
is true, even though they might not always know what really exists and happens. 
Meanwhile, the grassroots could not involve in the truth-shaping decision, but they 
might have access to approach and collect different fragments of factual information 
and to publish and exchange ―truths‖ they discovered. Then, the mismatch and 
discrepancy between formal announcements (the single official story) and informal 
communications (whisperings, gossips, rumors, etc.) as a result are born. In certain 
extreme cases, the dominate groups might lie to the public and the latter might have to 
find the truth by themselves. No matter which case the reality is in, gossips, 
whisperings and rumors spread through the network of those unable to voice their 
opinions to the right places and those in irrelevant positions where there is no access 
to accurate information. Thus, it is irrational for the most powerful people to 
consistently tell from the beginning to the end the single story they decide as true. The 
extremely dominant position of the one story should be decentralized. Alternative 
truths could be available from such informal communications as today‘s web-blog and 
mobile text messages. Therefore, multi-voices should not be suppressed in crisis 
communication.  
 
  However, I should admit that this multi-voices theory is also ideal. In this approach, 
it is impossible for the communicator to allow all voices presented and then make up 
and take charge of the final story-telling where all voices coexist. For instance, in the 
internet communication case, it is not possible to control such a crisis communication 
if the multi audiences are unqualified in caring for their own information security 
(including telling, judging and weighing) and incompetent on knowledge shaping 
(Bucher, 2002). In short, multi-voiced response created opportunities ―for dissent, for 
opening up debate without forcing consensus‖ and for changes (Holtzhausen, 2000: p. 
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105) but the scale of multi-voices had better be narrowed down to a certain extent so 
that what would be said could be under control to overcome instead of worsening a 
crisis.  
2.6 Crisis Communication in a Complex Context and Chaos 
Theory 
  What I have illustrated before on crisis communication theories and strategies are 
only on micro scales. They are studies from particular cases and the communication is 
supposed to be bilateral in the relationship between the crisis-induced party and the 
public (as a whole). Many scholars advocate crisis response strategies as the effective 
solutions to maintain an organization‘s positive image during and after a crisis (Benoit, 
1997; Coombs 1995, 2000; Hearit, 1995). However, what should be taken into 
account during crisis communication is not just bilateral relation between 
communicators and message receivers but also the broad system these two parties are 
in. A strategy might work well in one context but fail in another. Borrowing 
Holtzhausen (2000)‘s words, crisis communication ―needs to be understood and 
examined in a broader social, cultural and political context rather than in a narrowly 
defined organizational function‖ (p. 95). Therefore I step further to a macro extent of 
crisis communication by introducing key concepts of chaos theory including fractals, 
strange attractors and self-organizations. 
 
  Certainly ―chaos‖ here does not mean random disorder. Chaos Theory believes that 
system behavior is usually unpredictable; components‘ interactions are unexpected 
and not linear; the established operations might become undependable during a crisis. 
However, a corresponding radical ―paralysis‖ of a normal system could be renewed 
and reemerged in a better order ―through natural self-organizing processes‖ (Seeger, 
2002: p. 329). No single spot of a series of chaotic events is predictable or 
conventional but if the whole series is viewed over an extended history, then it is quite 
possible to deduce the hiding order and rules (Murphy, 1996: p. 96). In other words, 
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chaos theory attempts to ―understand the seemingly random behavior exhibited by a 
simple deterministic system consisting of only a few variables or interacting 
components‖ (Comfort et al., 2001: p. 445). Or it could be even said that chaos theory 
guides people to understand the seemingly random behavior, assuming that there is a 
deterministic system within which variables exists and give birth to unexpected 
outcomes when they interact internally. In Kiel (1994: p. 7)‘s word, chaos ―may be the 
necessary precursor of a higher level of order‖. 
 
Chaos theory offers no standards, but supposes that if general trends and broad 
patterns are examined within a more extended time frame, then the behavior of 
chaotic system seems more predictable. The chaotic behavior is aperiodic and 
dynamic but it is bounded in a deterministic system (Kaplan & Glass, 1995). The 
chaotic context is seemingly unpredictable but ―on successive iterations‖, the context 
―remains within a finite range‖ (Mathews, White & Long, 1999: p. 445). Similarly, 
crisis is unpredictable, but if it is put into a broad system in an extended period, then it 
might become predictable. Three key concepts of chaos theory as fractal, strange 
attractor and self-organization are presented here.  
 
  Fractals are forms with similar characteristics found across various scales with 
different ―relative degrees of complexity‖ of the same object (Murphy, 1996: p. 100). 
Fractals are patterns and features that naturally occur and self-repeat. These 
self-similarities can serve as a function to discover certain constant forms and can be 
link up to become an order of a chaotic system. Fractals could be summarized into 
categories and standards to find ―the common‖ across various levels, places, scales 
and phenomena. Fractals manifest self-similarities and patterns in the face of apparent 
chaos and ―determining fractals, then, requires an inclusive and broad perspective‖ 
(Sellnow et al., 2002: p. 273). 
 
  Strange attractors stress on orders and forms within chaos. Attractors are strange to 
people because the relevant outcomes are always unpredictable as they ―do not 
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operate from a fixed point or in linear ways and may create seemingly contradictory 
and paradoxical forces‖ (Seeger, 2002: p. 334). However, strange attractors are always 
within vast but bounded macro dimensions. They are the underlying orders according 
to which people again and again reconstruct their systems at post-evolution stages. 
Furthermore, a strange attractor actually could be treated as a curve of bunches of 
fractals, repeated self-similarities, assuming that these diverse ―fractals‖ are governed 
with the related ―attractor‖ but the result of the co-bursts of fractals is always 
unpredictable. Strange attractors ―take the form of general and fundamental social 
assumptions, values, first principles, conflicting tensions and needs, or oppositional 
paradoxes to which a social system naturally and continually returns‖ (Sellnow et al, 
2002: p. 273). 
 
  The most interesting feature of chaos theory is the concept of self organization. 
Loye & Eisler (1987) believed that chaotic situations ―generate their own new forms 
from inner guidelines rather than the imposition of form from outside‖ (p. 56). 
Kauffman (1995) argued that new order would be built up upon internal guidelines 
and principles of the old order of the complex system which was in chaos during the 
crisis. These guidelines and principles drive and force the system to adapt to the 
chaotic situation, ―leading systems to higher levels of complexity and order following 
the collapse or bifurcation of a lower order system‖ (Seeger, 2002: p. 333). Fractals 
repeat and strange attractors bring unexpected results and by self-organizing, a new 
and upgraded order is reemerged. Self-organization could be fulfilled when a crisis 
brings chaos.  
 
  Chaos theory could be applied to find out what kinds of crisis communication 
repeat themselves, what changes on crisis communication exist after crises and 
possibly, what principles rule these repetitions and changes. An extended time series 
and a perspective broader than the organizational one are needed for such application.  
2.7 Summary of theories 
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  To sum up, after explanations on principal theories of attribution of responsibility 
to crisis, ongoing character of crisis and the impacts on and responses to crisis, the 
section of fundamental theories introduces crisis communication strategies which 
flourished in 1990s and further evolved in the 21
st
 century. Multi-voices are claimed 
to be of great importance to informational needs and truth discovery in crisis 
communication during the crisis event. The communication discourse of renewal is 
also highlighted to explain how to examine whether or not an optimistic post-crisis 
communication exists. Chaos theory follows to analyze the existence of implicit 
principles for crisis communication at a broad level in extended time series. I choose 
to analyze crisis communication in a governmental context focusing on the central 
government of China and compare the communication differences involving these 
two cases in a time period from 2003 to 2009. Both of the two cases in this thesis 
were related to public emergencies, thus the crisis communications were not limited 
in certain communities; instead, they required different responses from different 
sectors at different locations. Therefore, it would be better to apply chaos theory to 
discover the crisis communication rules and principles. 
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3. The SARS Crisis 
3.1 The Responsibility Attributions of the Government to the 
SARS Crises 
  According to Attribution Theory, at the beginning of t the SARS epidemic, the 
locus of control was ―external‖ to the Chinese government because the crisis cause 
(causal agent of the epidemic) was carried from exotic animals to human beings. And 
the stability of this crisis was ―low‖ as the cause was coincident and variable. The 
crisis was due to certain transformed coronavirus transferred originally from masked 
palm civets to humans (Shi & Hu, 2008), thus the controllability was ―low‖, too. 
Therefore, the government‘s attribution to the crisis could be perceived as ―low‖ at 
this stage. This epidemic crisis was an accident because it was uncontrollable and 
unstable. Nevertheless, the Chinese central government tried to cover up the outbreak 
of SARS in February and March in order to maintain the stability of the society and to 
guarantee the normal running of the National People‘s Congress and the Chinese 
People‘s Political Consultative Conference (Jian, n. d.; Chen, 2008). This internal 
action was taken even though it is well known that such actions would leave publics 
in risk. ―Poor access to information on disease outbreaks fuels panic, limits 
appropriate responses and has a negative economic, social and political impact‖ (UN, 
2003: p. 1). At this point, the initial epidemic crisis was partly twisted from a 
complete accident into a transgression. The cover-up was intentional and it was from 
according to the internal order. Therefore, the crisis type of the SARS epidemic in 
China was a combination of ―Accident‖ and ―Transgression‖.  
 
Table 3: Crisis type of the SARS Crisis 
 Unintentional Intentional 
External Ambiguity Terrorism 
Internal ACCIDENT TRANSGRESSION 
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  The veracity of evidence in this crisis was quite poor and inaccurate. The causal 
agent of SARS was not finally confirmed until April 16, 2003 (Tsinghua & Renmin, 
2004). As per the internal instruction from the Central Propaganda Division in 
February (Chen, 2008), the regional governments first denied that there was an 
unknown disease spreading. As a result, rumors grew up and exaggerated (Zhou, 
2003). Later when the epidemic extended to Beijing, the central government still 
denied the severity of SARS till April 20, 2003. The intentional and continuous 
cover-ups of SARS probable cases and death numbers did not bring social stability as 
the Party and the central government expected. Oppositely, fear was accumulated and 
it seemed that people feared because of their fear more than the disease itself (Li, 
2006). From April 20, 2003, facts and practical works were published day by day and 
the public gradually trusted the government instead of information from personal and 
informal channels. 
 
  In the 7 months from November, 2002, to June, 2003, SARS claimed 349 lives in 
China (WHO, 2003b). In total, the domestic economic loss was uncountable. The 
crisis also powerfully forced the legislation on national information openness to 
reform (Chen, 2008). 
 
  Historically, the Chinese government was greatly infamous for covering up and 
concealing information and evidence during crises. In other words, the crisis 
communication performance of the Chinese government historically was authoritarian 
and negative. When SARS was covered up as other crises in history in a repeated way, 
the public were ―more likely to attribute responsibility to‖ the government (Coombs 
& Holladay, 1996: p. 282). Consequentially, people might criticize the Chinese 
government even more than they deserved due to their negative performance record. 
 
  To sum up, the crisis responsibility attribution of SARS to the Chinese government 
was high. First, this crisis was located in both the categories of ―Accidents‖ and 
―Transgressions‖. Such a cross-type position was in parallel with an intersection of 
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the victim cluster, including disease and the intentional cluster consisting of 
governmental misdeeds, in accordance with Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT). Then, the veracity of evidence was low and damage concerned was grave. 
Third, the crisis consistency was high because in the past, the central government had 
been used to not reporting negative news or for delaying the reporting in public (Chen, 
2008). Additionally, every time it came to negative news including disasters, diseases 
and security, the principle adopted by the Chinese government was to strictly control 
the open reports on such facts as the number of deaths (He, 2004). Thus the 
distinctiveness of the governmental performance history was low. Put in Coombs 
(2007b)‘s words, the low distinctiveness plus the high consistency in performance 
history increased the reputational threat the Chinese government faced. 
3.2 The Central Government’s Crisis Communicative Strategies 
  As analyzed above, the SARS crisis was not only a public epidemic disaster but 
also a ―full-blown political crisis‖ (Fewsmith, 2003: p. 250). The crisis responsibility 
attribution to the Chinese government was high. At the early stage of this crisis, the 
central government of China was heavily criticized mostly in indirect and informal 
ways because the mass media became mute under the press of the central government. 
Furthermore, communication in China via the mass media on significant events was 
first under strict control in accordance with certain so-called ―principles and rules of 
propagandas‖. Sources of public news and information were strictly limited to the 
―standard reports‖ (tong gao) from the central propaganda agents like the Xinhua 
News Agency (He, 2004). In addition, direct and open governmental response at the 
state‘s level about the national wide SARS infection started from April 2 (Jian, n. d.). 
And on April 8, the published email signed by Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a retired head of a 
military hospital, criticized and revealed that the Ministry of Health (MoH) of China 
concealed the real situation of SARS spread thus turned a pure epidemic crisis into an 
epidemic-and-political one. The dismissals of the Minister of Health (Zhang Wenkang) 
and Beijing Mayor (Meng Xuenong) on April 20, 2003, marked a significant change 
of the central government‘s crisis communicative strategies. In accordance with all 
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these turning points of the development of the SARS crisis, I choose to analyze and 
categorize the central government‘s crisis communicative strategies (CCSs) from 
April to June, 2003, based on Huang et al (2005).‘ categories and the SARS-related 
news summary special edited by Tsinghua University and Renmin University in 
China. 
 
  From Appendix One (see page 54-57)  on crisis communicative strategies, it is 
found that the central government employed strategies of Denial, Justification, 
Concession and Diversion, including nine sub-strategies of simple denial, fact twisting, 
reframing, compensation, corrective or proactive works, changing public policies, 
instructive information and internal scapegoating. New strategies such as building a 
new agenda and setting exemplary figures/deeds could also be found in the People‘s 
War.  
 
  The use of simple denial was concentrated at the beginning of April from 
different resources to confirm that SARS did not spread further. On April 3, 2003, the 
Minister of Health (Zhang Wenkang) strongly confirmed that it was safe to travel and 
stay in China. On the next day, some top leader in the National Tourism 
Administration claimed that no tourist in China was infected by SARS. Ironically, 
such denials were meanwhile in contrast against the serious considerations of the 
disease from the highest level of the government (Fewsmith, 2003). For example, on 
April 2, 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao chaired a State Council executive meeting 
discussing the control and prevention of SARS in China (Tai & Sun, 2007). 
According to He (2004)‘s standards on judging implicit meanings from the non-open 
official media news in China, if attentions and concerns to the event from the highest 
level of the central government was explicitly expressed, then the related event was 
extremely grave. In short, the central government employed the sub-strategy of simple 
denial in an inconsistent way. 
 
The strategy of Excuse was not used in the central government‘s crisis 
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communication. Although the whole world was unable to know the causal agent of the 
disease till mid April, the Chinese government never admitted their defeasibility and 
vulnerability against SARS. Instead, in the first half of April, it was confidently 
repeated by the Chinese government that SARS was ―under an effective control‖, 
even before the world‘s confirmation on the causal agent on April 16, 2003 (Tsinghua 
& Renmin, n. d.). On the one hand, the avoidance of the use of defeasibility might 
avoid reducing people‘s confidence on overcome the new disease; on the other hand, 
such exaggeration might produce little accountability on the information from the 
government. 
 
Fact twisting was not included in my previous presentation on Huang et al. (2005)‘s 
crisis communicative strategies but it existed in the governmental crisis 
communication in China for the purposing of minimizing the negative effect of 
unpredicted crises. However, this was different from the sub-strategy of minimization. 
Fact twisting tried to minimize the apparent harm of the disease through offering 
incorrect numbers smaller than what really existed. Meanwhile, the truth was reserved 
for and circulated within the government internally. Differently, basing on the correct 
figures, minimization would suggest that the real damage of the crisis was not as large 
as expected by using other standards to evaluate the impact and claiming that the 
previous standards are inappropriate (Huang et al., 2005). The differences between 
these two strategies were 1) the correct information was uncovered; and 2) the 
arguments were based on the same facts but from different angles. 
 
The Chinese government did not employ the sub-strategy of apology though it was 
obvious that the government should be partly responsible for the expanded outbreak 
of SARS in April, as per the discussion on its responsibility attribution in the previous 
subsection. Governmental apology has been a political promise to reconcile social 
conflicts but it seldom happens in China because in an authoritarian regime, apology 
is believed to be a face-losing and power-infecting practice (Xu, 2003). Thus it is not 
―Chinese‖ to expect direct and open words of ―We are wrong‖ and ―Please forgive 
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us…‖ from the central government. 
 
  It was commonly believed that April 20, 2003, was a significant turning point of the 
SARS crisis. From this day, the central government began upgrading correct figures 
on SARS probable cases and deaths; and more importantly, Deputy Minister of Health, 
Gao Qiang, admitted in a press conference in the State Council that there were 
imperfections and weak links existed in the work of the Ministry of Health (MoH). 
This was treated as an implicit ―admittance of fault‖; however, still no open apology 
was done by the government. Gao also corrected the numbers of probable cases from 
1435 (up to April 15) to 1807 (up to April 18). He reframed the sudden change and 
significant increase of numbers by reasoning as follows, 1) time was needed to 
confirm and sum up numbers reported from different administrative levels; 2) 
hospitals hardly had any internal communication and information resources 
integration; and 3) the MoH was not well prepared for urgent response to public 
health emergencies (Xinhua, 2003a). Then, in his conclusion, the government did not 
try to cover up SARS spread on purpose. In my conclusion, the Chinese government 
was good at using reframing to substitute apology. 
 
On the same day, the Minister of Health became the first and the highest-level 
officer dismissed for his incapability and misdeeds in the SARS control and 
prevention. The individuals in charge became scapegoats for the crisis (Chen, 2008). 
In Brinson and Benoit (1999)‘s words, the blame was transferred to ―a subgroup of 
the accused‖ (p. 483). This removal of top government member ―was a means to 
restore the public trust‖ to the government (Zhou, n. d.). This was an application of 
internal scapegoating, which claimed that only some people in the government made 
mistakes. 
 
  Meanwhile, President Hu Jintao clearly pointed out that the crux to win the fight 
against disease was to fully utilize science and technologies, again on April 20 
(People, 2003). The communication sub-strategy of building a new agenda in the 
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category of Diversion was applied, but to a different extent. Originally, building a new 
agenda was to ―create a new issue in order to switch or distract the media focus or 
public attention‖ (Huang et al., 2005: p. 235). In reality, Hu Jintao built a new focus 
on the vital role of science and technologies in the control and prevention of SARS. 
The previous critical focus on political misdeeds on the SARS control and prevention 
might be reduced or switched, though the issue of ―SARS outbreak had expanded‖ did 
not change. From late April 2003, Hu called for a nation-wide ―People‘s War against 
SARS‖ by ―urging a patriotic campaign to wage a ‗People‘s War‘ against the disease 
(Tai & Sun, 2007; Bezlova, 2003; Hu, 2003). Many medical workers and other people 
in the frontier of this War were propagated as exemplary figures and their deeds were 
highlighted as well to concentrate common attentions to all people‘s enemy (SARS) 
and to raise common confidence in winning the War (Hu, 2003). By doing so, the 
focus of the issue of ―the SARS control and prevention‖ was successfully shifted to a 
war between all the Chinese and the disease. In this case, the central government was 
the leader and an in-grouper of the big group of ―all the Chinese‖. Therefore, the 
central government led people to fight hard against people‘s enemy which produced 
harms and deaths, so the central government was certainly not to blame.  
 
Corrective or proactive works from the central government had been frequently 
instructed and enforced since April 2, 2003. From Appendix One (see page 73-76), it 
was clearly found that this crisis communicative strategy was heavily employed all 
over April. Such works were centrally directed by the State Council and ordered from 
various departments at the state‘s level to numerous sub-departments and units all 
over the country. For example, on April 2, 2008, the control of SARS was seriously 
considered by the State Council as ―the very important among those important‖ in the 
hygiene work. On April 17 and 18, related state and regional departments and units 
were required to well prepare for medicine production, storage and supply in the 
market to prevent the SARS spread. And for the first in the history of the People‘s 
Republic of China, Vice Premier (Wu Yi) was appointed as the director to fight 
against a disease on April 23, 2008 (Tsinghua & Renmin, n. d.). Undoubtedly, these 
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works devoted huge to control and finally diminish SARS in China.  
 
Compensations were offered to victims of SARS. Funds for constructions on 
central and regional centers for disease control and prevention were distributed to a 
number of regions with a special attention to those undeveloped. Certain groups of 
SARS-infected patients could receive treatments concerned for free. Insurance was 
open to the SARS-affected insured. Taxes were reduced for heavily SARS-hit 
industries and business sections. Monetary lending standards were loosened by the 
Central Bank as well.  
 
Instructive Information was also published during the crisis. The Chinese Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) and the MoH respectively published 
proposals, methods and diagnostic reference and so forth for medical works and other 
citizen groups. Laws and regulations concerned were explained and broadcasted to 
help people understand what they could and should do. 
 
The strategy of Changing Public Policy was also adopted by the central government. 
SARS was included in the legitimate category of regulatory infective diseases 
management by the MoH on April 14, 2008. From then on, legal reference to the 
treatment of SARS was established. More importantly and significantly, the State 
Council published the Regulation on the Urgent Handling of Public Health 
Emergencies on May 12, 2008, starting the reform on China‘s public health sector. 
To conclude, the five crisis communicative strategies were all used except for 
Excuse. The central government favored a secretive and authoritarian way of crisis 
communication but they became open and transparent after April 20, 2008. 
Meanwhile, no apology was delivered in public for the government‘s mistakes. 
However, a large number of corrective and proactive works were carried out to 
prevent and control SARS. And the government took the advantage of 
authoritarianism to stabilize the whole society by controlling the media. 
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3.3 The Discourse of Renewal 
  Analyses start from the central government‘s post-crisis communication after Jiang 
Yanyong exposed the official concealment on SARS probable cases. The SARS crisis 
peaked then as a result of the increase of SARS threat and the critics on governmental 
concealment on real information. 
 
  On April 13, 2003, Wen Jiabao reaffirmed and rebuilt the importance of the SARS 
control and prevention in a State Council executive meeting by pointed out that the 
prevention and control of SARS was related to the mass‘ interest, concerned with the 
macro stability of Chinese‘s economic development and in connection with the 
country‘s interest and international image (Xinhua, 2003b). At this moment, the SARS 
control and prevention served for the interest of the country and all citizens in China. 
Right on the next day, President Hu Jintao double confirmed Wen‘s saying. As noted 
above, a ―People‘s War against SARS‖ was called then by Hu Jintao to evoke 
patriotism. Such communications were provisional but not strategic. They were 
immediate responses to the crisis for timely protecting or restoring the government‘s 
image and for temporarily but strongly handling and diminishing the disease.  
 
  Concerning the prospective outlook in positive manners in the crisis 
communication, the central government was good at doing so via propaganda. For 
example, the government-controlled mainstream media at the state‘s level, especially 
the CCTV, intensively ―created a united and harmonious social environment‖ (Hu, 
2003
3
). Various TV specials were produced to enable people to learn the most 
upgraded information; and to build a national wide common sense of the war against 
SARS thus to ―turn people‘s negative feeling of fear to the worship of anti-SARS 
medical workers‖ (Hu, 2003). The central government heavily emphasized the efforts 
and confidence to win the war in meetings at the highest level as aforementioned. 
 
                                                        
3 No exact page existed in the web edition. 
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  The optimistic focus concentrates on ―the ability of the organization to reconstitute 
itself by capitalizing on the opportunities embedded within the crisis‖ (Ulmer et al. 
2007: p. 132). Unfortunately, then central government was so simple-minded and 
one-sided in winning the People‘s War against SARS that the crisis communication 
indicated little on opportunities behind SARS. They did not treat the crisis as 
something normal in their life cycle of the governance. In Chen (2008)‘s words, 
―traditional Chinese government often saw crisis as something undesirable and 
something to be minimized or concealed‖ (p. 46). What is worse, the government did 
a lot to better the response system to public health emergencies including efforts 
shown in Appendix One (see page 73-76). However, when communicated with the 
public, for example, in the press conference introducing the Regulation on the Urgent 
Handling of Public Health Emergencies, the central government did not relate SARS 
as a turning point and a chance of pushing this upgrade of the national hygiene system 
(Tsinghua & Renmin, n. d.). Adversely, the public recognized opportunities brought 
by SARS. A survey
4
 carried out in late May, 2003, by Nanjing University covering 
five cities consisting Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Nanjing showed 
that 74.1% of the interviewees in the five cities saw chances behind the crisis, 
including people‘s behavior changes, hygiene knowledge promotion, reviews and 
research on public relations and the media reform. Unfortunately, this public fountain 
of power was not listened or utilized by the central government. 
 
  The fourth and last character of the discourse of renewal is that leaders ―possess a 
certain prestige‖ (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: p. 363). Hu Jintao had been 
marked as a decisive politician with an image of people-first before the SARS crisis 
and Wen Jiabao was said to be greatly cautious and highly responsible with events in 
charge (Li, 2001). After becoming the top leaders in China, they promoted the policy 
of ―putting people first (yi ren wei ben)‖ (Chen, 2008: p. 38). Wu Yi had been 
characterized as a tough negotiator and she instructed sword laws when charging the 
SARS prevention and control (Tsinghua & Renmin, n. d.). During this crisis, 
                                                        
4 Crisis brings us to become mature: the 2nd report on SARS based on surveys from 5 cities in China (2003). 
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especially in April and May, the collective leadership guided by Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao at the highest level and with Wu Yi as the acting director showed these leaders‘ 
strict and strong determinations and power to run a national war. 
 
  Three conditions are needed to form a discourse of renewal. First, there should be a 
massive destruction. Certainly SARS produced some. Then a reestablishment of 
confidence via corrective actions was done by the central government as analyzed 
above in the characters of the discourse and communicative strategies in the crisis 
communication. Finally, mutual commitments to prevent and control SARS between 
the public and the government were necessary. Nevertheless, commitments from the 
government to the public were delivered but not the reverse. The public recognized 
opportunities embedded within the SARS crisis, but their recognitions were 
marginalized when the core value of ―to unite and fight against SARS national wide 
and to win the war‖ (Hu, 2003) in the ―People‘s War against SARS‖ was 
over-centered. Again in the aforementioned survey (before SARS faded away), the 
majority of citizens were willing to commit to voluntary works for SARS control and 
prevention. The percentage of this willing group among all interviewees reached 
85.3%, much higher than the 6.4% of the unwilling. However, on the one hand, the 
central government just kept ―fighting, alone‖ (Jian, n. d.); on the other hand, there is 
a lack of effective organizations for these potential volunteers to fulfill their 
commitments (Tsinghua & Renmin, 2003).  To sum up, in the SARS crisis, the 
central government failed in building a discourse of renewal; or to be more precise, 
they did not realize to do so. 
3.4 Multi-voices in Crisis Communication 
  Crisis communication should not be unilateral as there are at least two sides (parties) 
in the communication progress. However, it seemed that crisis communication in the 
Chinese context was carried out in a single direction instead of in the way of mutual 
information exchange. The central government dominated the communication 
narrative. 
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  From the end of February to March, 2003, the Chinese government monopolized 
the media and made it mute on SARS (Jian, n. d.). This absence of honest 
communication from the central government created ―a vacuum‖ that tended to ―be 
filled by rumor and gossip‖ (Bergquist, 1993: p. 128). Official announcements and 
informal communication then mismatched. The hidden fact then generated many 
stories in different visions. As SARS was easily transmissible and unknown, the 
public was terrified and their fear reversely increased their desire and motivation to 
know what was really happening. To them, personal experience, self-observations and 
information exchanges between friends and acquaintances were more credible and 
accountable than official resources (Zhou, 2003). Thus, rumors, either true or false, 
spread supported by such modern communication means as text messages and the 
internet. Gossips also became an alternative mode of communication and an important 
way of information gathering. People just followed ―their instinct‖ (Chen, 2008: p. 
46). All these non-official communication weakened the persuasiveness and 
effectiveness of the official one to the public.  
 
In fact, the public had different narratives but most of them were disempowered. 
For example, professional views were marginalized. In an economic conference 
chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao, Wu Jinglian, a Chinese economist, heavily criticized 
on the MoH‘s non-transparent information and news blocks (Lou, 2003). Dr. Jiang 
Yanyong from a military hospital in Beijing disclosed the MoH‘s lie on SARS by 
email to CCTV Channel-4 but the media in China still kept silent (Tsinghua & 
Renmin, n. d.; Pottinger & Hutzler, 2003). Dr. Zhong Nanshan, head of the Advisory 
Group of Guangdong SARS Control and Prevention also criticized such saying as 
―effective control‖. In this famous SARS fighter‘s view, a disease could not be 
controlled before the causal agent was found out (Tsinghua & Renmin, n. d.). Sadly, 
such voices from the public were all disempowered. The central government of China 
still kept their single voice insisting that SARS was under their effective control and 
delayed their honest communication until April 20, 2003.  
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3.5 Summary of the SARS Case 
  To sum up, in the SARS crisis, the central government of China failed in openly 
and honestly communicating with the public in a timely manner. Multi-voices from 
the public were marginalized. Truth was covered up at the beginning; and at the later 
stage, the central government had to devote tremendous corrective and proactive 
works to reconstruct damages, reduce further loss and restore their image and 
accountability. The government called for a ―people‘s war‖ against SARS and 
succeeded but they did not utilize the power and willingness of the public. Thus the 
government continued their tradition of fighting alone and no discourse of renewal 
during the crisis communication was successfully founded. 
  
 36 
 
4. The Wenchuan Earthquake 
4.1. Responsibility Attribution of the Government in the 
Wenchuan Event 
  Again the three dimensions of locus, stability and controllability are used here. In 
the Wenchuan earthquake, the locus was external because the government did not 
produce or promote this disaster intentionally. The external control of the crisis was 
high because few in the world could always correctly anticipate the movements of the 
earthquake. When the government claimed that they were not capable to foresee such 
a disaster, it would be understandable for the public because earthquakes were beyond 
man‘s control. In short, the crisis type of the Earthquake was Accident. And the 
corresponding crisis type it belonged to, in Coombs (2007b)‘s standards, was victim 
cluster. In general, the government was not to blame and no apology was needed for 
an earthquake. 
 
 
Figure 1: Crisis type of the Wenchuan earthquake 
 
  Surprisingly, the veracity of evidence during the Wenchuan earthquake event was 
much higher than that in the SARS crisis. First, an 8.0-degree earthquake could not be 
hidden away from the public. Second, modern communication means enabled the 
public to exchange information and monitor news reports. For example, netizens
5
 
communicated on the earthquake less than one minute after it happened (Qu, Wu & 
                                                        
5 In general definition, netizens are people who use the internet minimal one hour per week (on 
average). Actually, many of them in China spend much long time than that to get, release and 
exchange (online) information, opinions, knowledge, etc. 
External locus 
High uncontrollability 
External 
Unintentional 
ACCIDENT 
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Wang, 2009). More importantly, the Chinese government instructed news agencies 
including the Xinhua News Agency and the CCTV, to update relevant information 
around the clock; and the State Council held press conferences on a daily basis from 
May 13, 2008 for more than two weeks. All these assured an open and transparent 
flow of timely and real information. 
 
  The damage was grave, much more terrible than the SARS crisis. By midday of 
June 16, 2008, the death toll in the Wenchuan earthquake reached 69,146 with another 
17,516 registered as missing (CCTV, 2008a). 
 
Concerning the government‘s performance, the stability was ―low‖ as the 
government responded openly, immediately and positively after the earthquake, which 
was kind of unexpected and surprising, compared with their history of dealing with 
crisis. Furthermore, the public‘s right to know was belittled for so long a time that 
they did not expect such an openness and transparency (Dong, 2008). Such an 
expressive and positive contrast make the public more likely to evaluate high the 
government‘s efforts and less likely to attribute responsibility to the government 
(Peng, 2008). There had been similar crises in the past like the Tangshan earthquake 
in 1976 and the death toll of 240,000 was known only at the end of 1979 (Dong, 
2008). The government did not handle the Wenchuan earthquake as before in other 
previous disasters by concealing or degrading the loss and death toll. The openness, 
timeliness and transparency they showed made a sudden inconsistency in the 
government‘s crisis history. Thus the consistency was ―low‖. And the 
distinctiveness—historically, how the government has treated the public in other 
contexts—was more or less the same as that of the SARS crisis five years before 
during. For instances, in 2003, the government concealed SARS at the early stage of 
the crisis; in 2005, they again covered up the water-head pollution of Songhua River 
in the northeast (Liu, 2007). As a result, the perception on the government‘s openness 
and honesty was low. Thus both the distinctiveness and the consistency were low, 
according to situational crisis communication theory. In this case, the responsibility 
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attribution and reputation threat might be low because the low consistency could 
possibly counter off the low distinctiveness in performance history.  
4. 2 The Central Government’s Crisis Communicative Strategies 
in the Wenchuan Event 
  The Xinhua News Agency (2008a) delivered the first official news flashes less than 
20 minutes after the Wenchuan earthquake and continued reporting governmental 
responses nonstop. In the rest 9 hours and 32 minutes of May 12, 2008, the following 
were updated one by one in a timely manner. 
 
Table 4: Responses from the central government on the Wenchuan earthquake in 
10 hours (CCTV, 2008b) 
Time Events 
14: 54 The Richter scale of 7.8
6
 of the Wenchuan earthquake was confirmed. 
15: 55 President Hu Jintao required saving as much life as possible. 
16: 40 Premier Wen Jiabao departed from Beijing to the quake-hit zone. Wen held 
an on-flight meeting stressing the importance of calmness, confidence, 
courage and strong leadership. 
18: 49 Troops of more than 6,000 from Sichuan urgently headed for Wenchuan. 
19: 40 The Red Cross of China transferred goods and materials of RMB780, 000 
(NOK563, 927)
7
 to the quake-hit zone. 
20: 00 Wen reached Dujianyan (Sichuan). Later, Hu in Beijing established the 
Headquarter for Earthquake Rescue and Relief with Wen as the director. 
22: 00 Wen went to hospitals and schools in Dujiangyan and paid condolence to 
student victims with three bows. 
23: 15 First-class national response system to diastral emergencies started running. 
                                                        
6 On May 18, 2008, the scale was revised to 8.0. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/18/content_8200610.htm  
7 http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter#from=CNY;to=NOK;amt=780 (1RMB=0.723NOK) 
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23: 45 Wen held an in-tent rescue and relief meeting and emphasized that the top 
priority was to save life as soon as possible. 
 
  This time, the Chinese government disclosed the disaster and their corresponding 
reactions by implying the fastest and most proactive crisis communication. This 
initiation on crisis communication fitted Dillenschneider & Hyde (1985)‘s principles 
of ―tell it fast‖ and ―tell it all‖. Such initiation allowed the government to ―set the tone 
for coverage of the crisis‖ and to become persuasive (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 
2005: p. 426). And the low-distinctiveness perception on the central government was 
broken from this moment. In the next paragraphs, the central government‘s crisis 
communicative strategies would be analyzed to examine how they ―told it all‖. 
 
  Defeasibility was employed time and again by the central government in press 
conferences held by the State Council. For instance, when asked if the China 
Earthquake Administration concealed the early warning in order to assure stability for 
the coming Olympic Games, according to certain rumor, the government answered the 
question with difficulties of quake anticipation (Xinhua, 2008e). In another case, 
when the relief speed was doubted, post-quake cautiousness, after-shock preventions 
and road blocks were stressed (China, 2008d). When the military was questioned on 
the inefficiency and poor relief equipments (though their efforts were appreciated), 
the difficulty of transporting professional gigantic equipments due to road blocks was 
explained (State Council, 2008b). All these could be found in Appendix Two (see 
page 77-79) 
 
  However, the government not only showed their defeasibility to the natural disaster, 
which might decrease the public‘s confidence to them, but also reframed the 
government‘s work limits in a larger and more favorable context. On May 18, 2008, 
when asked if China had its own professional and specific force for disaster relief 
instead of relying on the military force, the government answered that the People‘s 
Liberation Army (PLA) had been equipped and trained for disaster relief purpose.  
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Soldiers‘ digging victims out with bloody hands and parachuting without precise 
weather information or ground guides were both exemplified to reframe the 
disadvantage concerning the lack of high-tech equipments (State Council, 2008b). 
Furthermore, when critics came, the government employed the sub-strategy of excuse 
as well. Some people suspected that many schools were damaged heavily because of 
jerry-built constructions. Then in the governmental answer, student-focus media 
reports, life-saving relief efforts made by the government and the severity of the 
earthquake were all emphasized (China, 2008a).  
 
  The willingness for remediation, rectification and proactive works were expressed 
in the crisis communication. The strategy of concession was heavily employed. In 
Huang et al. (2005)‘s categories, such sub-strategies belong to the category of 
concession where the organization caused the event and apologized for the crisis, but 
here I should point out that in the Wenchuan event, the government had no 
responsibility to apologize for the cause of the disaster and of course they carried out 
proactive works without apologizing. Lots of proactive works were done. It was also a 
must for the government to compensate victims, help them to solve urgent post-quake 
difficulties and rebuild the quake-hit zone. According to the press conference on May 
15, 2008, the government admitted that no burden of medical treatments should be 
loaded on victims and the government should be responsible for helping victims 
getting good medical services. Besides goods, materials and medical services, special 
allowances were distributed to victims. Instructive information was printed and 
distributed to the quake-hit zone to disseminate basic knowledge on assuring the 
safeties of water heads and drinking water, etc. Adaptive Information was used too to 
intervene in the quake-induced psychological impact and other passive feelings 
victims encountered (State Council, 2008c). On the press conference dated May 23, 
2008, a series of works on adaptive information were reported. According to the 
report, the placatory mental intervention to victims had reached 200,000 person-times 
after the quake. The central government‘s policies were changed correspondingly too 
(State Council, 2008a). The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Precautions 
 41 
 
against Earthquakes and Relief of Disaster was revised and approved in December 
2008 (Xinhua, 2008b). May 12 has become the Hazard Prevention and Mitigation 
Day in China since 2009, approved by the State Council (GOV, 2009a).  
 
  The central government was also good at propagating exemplary doings. Medical 
workers walked tens of miles to heavily ruined regions for relief work when other 
transportation means were stopped. And this was stressed when the Minister of Health 
(Gao Qiang) held the 3
rd
 press conference of the State Council on May 15, 2008 to 
exemplify medical workers‘ royalty to the country and people and to show reliability 
of medical workers national wide (State Council, 2008c). Soldiers struggled for forty 
hours plus to dig out an 11-year-old girl. And this was listed as a vivid example by the 
Ministry of National Defense on May 18, 2008, to illustrate how hard the military was 
rescuing people (State Council, 2008b). This was new to Huang et al. (2005)‘s model 
because the government was emphasizing their ―current‖ (not former) positive records 
and good doings to demonstrate that they were doing hard to relieve victims. And this 
was more than ―proactive works‖ because the government set up exemplary figures, 
guided by certain political purpose, and propagated their deeds in order to establish 
certain models (dian xing) for people to follow all over the nations (Feng, 2007). 
Therefore, I called such communicative strategy setting exemplary figures/deeds. 
 
Diversion was employed. Shoddily built schools were so highlighted by many 
common people that this issue were discussed and tracked on the internet with special 
attention and focus. The central government responded with the sub-strategy of 
showing regards/sympathy by saying that they were ―terribly heart-broken for the 
injuries and deaths of students‖ and the in-question would be investigated in the next 
step (China, 2008a). In this case, the government at the same time employed another 
typical Chinese sub-strategy which I personally named future orientation. It stated 
promises for blurred changes in the unknown future. Information got from such 
communication was always ambiguous and the actual effect could be either positive 
or negative due to such ambiguity and sometimes these promises waned as time went 
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by (Wu, 2004). People, both victims and non-victims looked for guarantees, but some 
promises from the government sounded so blurring that people doubted whether 
justice could come. However, such promises sounded acceptable and reasonable in 
such a culture with low uncertainty avoidance (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988) as 
the Chinese one, thus furious people calmed down even though promises were 
ambiguous. Promises were made to temporarily decrease people‘s anger and time 
finally killed dissatisfactions and protections. On June 23, 2008, the State Council 
held the 28
th
 press conference to report related investigations and tracking after the 
Wenchuan earthquake. School destructions were described as ―too complicated to 
give any conclusion‖ and it was promised that if corruptions were found, punish 
would be imposed by law (Xinhua, 2008c). When chasing the promise fulfillment on 
jerry-built schools one year after the Wenchuan earthquake, it was learned that the 
central government did not unveil any official report concerned but admitted that it 
was of huge difficulty to conclude specific attributions of all possible causes each 
(GOV, 2009b). 
4.3 The Discourse of Renewal in the Wenchuan Event 
  In the Wenchuan crisis communication, the government presented a provisional 
concept of ―one big family‖ to evoke patriotism thus the interest of the quake-hit zone 
became the interest of China, the big family. When Premier Wen Jiabao visited 
victims in Beichuan on May 14, 2008, he told the locals that ―your families are our 
families; your children are our children‖ (China, 2008c). In the State Council‘s press 
conferences (China, 2008a; 2008d), the concept of ―big family‖ was also stressed by 
repeating ―one side in trouble, all sides help‖ (yi fang you nan, ba fang zhi yuan). In 
the family culture of China, in-groupers should take care of others (Gudykunst & 
Ting-Toomey, 1988). Therefore, such presentations connected victims and 
non-victims together tightly. As Coombs (1995) indicated, victims expected a closure 
to a crisis; but non-victims did not stop at the point he assumed—―the crisis will not 
affect other groups, especially themselves‖ (p. 459). As other members of the big 
family, non-victims were willing to help victims to quickly return to their normal life. 
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Many people stood in queues to donate blood, money and goods to unknown victims; 
others voluntarily flew, draw and walked from various directions to the diastral region 
to help strangers.  
 
  A prospective outlook was positively installed from the beginning of this natural 
disaster. Before Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Sichuan, he already stressed on the 
importance of confidence. On May 21, 2008, when the main focus turned from 
rescuing to rebuilding, the State Council anticipated that expected economic growth in 
2008 would not be impeded due to the Wenchuan earthquake (China, 2008e). From 
May 23, 2008, ―rising from tribulations‖ (duo nan xing bang) became a nation-wide 
hot word after Wen Jiabao wrote it down on a blackboard in the Beichuan Middle 
School (People, 2008b).  
 
  A leader‘s individual prestige was quite influential and strong in the Wenchuan 
earthquake. Compare to the collective leadership in the SARS crisis, the prominent 
and individual leadership of Wen Jiabao stood out in the crisis communication after 
the earthquake. As a highest-level leader, Wen won a people-first image in previous 
disease and diastral events. After the quake, he took charge of the rescue and relief 
work on the spot and became a pop-start premier (Patil, 2008). In anti-disaster rescue 
and relief reports, he was the state-level leader who had been propagated most 
frequently and his historically consistent image of ―people-first‖ was unprecedentedly 
strengthened (Zhang, 2008). 
 
  However, the central government still stressed in public little on opportunities the 
disaster brought together with damages. In the aftermath of the earthquake, crisis 
communication of the central government and corresponding media reports guided by 
governmental signals shifted gradually from rescue, relief and humanitarianism to 
allocation and rebuilding (Zhou, 2008). People reviewed the disaster and proposed 
possible opportunities found but the central government seldom directly, positively 
and strongly confirmed or initiated any guidelines or thoughts on chances born in the 
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Wenchuan earthquake. In the 30
th
 press conference on the Wenchuan Earthquake, the 
Sichuan provincial government came to the State Council to report their rebuilding 
works. Positively, this local government strengthened such roles as economic aids and 
supports from the central government for building a strategic position of Sichuan in 
the future development plan of western China (China, 2008f). Scholars advocated 
these viewpoints too besides pointing out that the Wenchuan disaster enabled the 
Chinese government to restore a positive self-image (Qin, 2008; Zhang, 2008). 
However, such voices were not echoed by leaders on the top level. In President Hu 
Jintao‘s speech in the first anniversary of the Wenchuan earthquake, he reviewed 
efforts done and promoted future rebuilding plan but did not refer to any opportunities 
born from the earthquake (Xinhua, 2009). 
 
  Therefore, three of the four characters of the discourse of renewal were found out 
in the Wenchuan crisis communication but the central government still paid 
less-than-enough attention in their crisis communication to express and advocate their 
recognition on opportunities.  
 
Then it is time to check the three conditions of mutual commitments between the 
central government and the public and the existence of core values. As discussed 
above, the central government proactively and sufficiently carried out rescue and 
relief works in a timely manner. This time they no longer kept struggling alone. 
Donations from the public were called on. Citizens proactively participated in various 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to delicate to quake relief, post-quake 
psychotherapies to victims, etc (Caijing, 2008). The central government was in fact 
collecting the social power to repair the quake-hit zone, under the political slogan of 
―one big family‖. Thus the commitments between these two parties (the government 
and the public) were indeed bilateral. Furthermore, traditional core values of ―one side 
in trouble, all sides help out‖ (yi fang you nan, ba fang zhi yuan), ―time is life‖ and 
―putting people first‖ (yi ren wei ben) were all well repeated and propagated (Zhao, 
2008).  
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4.4 Multi-voices in Crisis Communication in the Wenchuan Event 
  Multi-voices were risen up and exchanged more frequently and more strongly in 
the Wenchuan event than before. As Tyler (2005) said, the power elite within the 
government ―usually determined whose truths counted as truth‖ (p. 568). This was 
quite true in an authoritarian country like China where the government illustrated 
whatever they would like to show to the outsiders via the government-controlled 
media (He, 2004). However, in the Wenchuan event, the government built up a 
humanitarian, open and transparent image. Thus during the Wenchuan event, voices 
from the grassroots were quite often listened and answered instead of being 
suppressed by authorities. Alternative truths emerged through informal 
communication, especially the online one. The internet was positioned as a platform 
for the common people to monitor official rescue and relief works (Zhou, 2008) and 
to talk with authorities (Yang & Liang, 2008). The internet continuously initiated hot 
topics and triggered heavy discussions thus gained attentions from traditional media 
including television which reported such topics afterwards (Zhou, 2008). 
 
For example, after salvation tents appeared in Chengdu, citizens initiated informal 
investigations, information collections and summing-ups online to expose this 
possible embezzlement (Wu et al., 2009). On May 23, 2008, the central government 
formally and positively responded to suspicions on such embezzlement in the State 
Council‘s press conference (State Council, 2008a). Exactly one month later, the State 
Council (China, 2008b) reported that up to June 20, 2008, 1,178 illegal or rule-broken 
cases had been uncovered by common people and most of the 1,007 investigated 
cases were related to embezzlements of salvation material including tents. The central 
government further confirmed that they would seriously consider and follow clues 
from the common people and exposures from the media on corruptions and other 
illegal issues in post-crisis relief and rebuilding projects. 
 
Due to the sudden openness in consensus and communication, the 
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mainstream-media-dominated information channel was enlarged into an integrated 
channel shared by the mainstream media, grass-root journalists and the common 
people (Yang & Liang, 2008). Web blogs of commentaries, forefront flashes via SMS, 
relief work following and online dear-ones searching flourished. On the one hand, the 
government and the public communicated effectively and mutually thus people‘s right 
to know was greatly satisfied (Peng, 2008). On the other hand, public opinion via the 
internet attracted more and more serious attentions from the officials. On June 20, 
2008, President Hu Jintao communicated online with netizens through a web forum 
when he visited the head quarter of People’s Daily (People, 2008a).  
4. 5 Summary of the Wenchuan Case 
To conclude, in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, the central government 
practiced crisis communication in an open and transparent way by not only telling fast 
but also telling all (Dong, 2008). Lots of proactive works were done properly and 
sometimes such efforts were propagated with certain political purpose. Still the 
central government left the public ambiguous promises which might not be fulfilled. 
Concerning the discourse of renewal, opportunities behind the crisis were not 
advocated by leaders at the highest level, neither. However, commitments between the 
two parties, the central government and the public, flew mutually and multi-voices 
from the grassroots were more encouraged than before. 
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5. Cross-case Studies 
5.1 Cross-case comparison 
5.1.1 Responsibility Attributions of the Government 
  The SARS crisis was an epidemical event combining a transgression from the 
central government at the early stage. It was worsened by the government‘s cover-up 
in a historically consistent manner. As a result, the governmental behavior were lowly 
distinctive. Even though later the central government of China became open in 
information delivery and struggled to repair their image, their performance in the 
SARS crisis were still critically exemplified as an extreme of incorrect crisis 
communication (Peng, 2008) in academic studies.  
 
The Wenchuan earthquake was another story. It was a natural disaster causing grave 
damages to Sichuan but enabling the central government to restore their image 
through open and transparent crisis communication in a timely manner (Zhang, 2008). 
Such responses were opposite to the central government‘s reactions in any similar 
crisis in history thus made an inconsistent point the performance record. Though their 
distinctiveness in history had been low, the central government‘s inconsistent 
responses became a milestone to switch the distinctiveness from low to high. 
5.1.2 Crisis Communicative Strategies 
  When compared with crisis communicative strategies (CCSs) of the central 
government in these two cases, it was learned that no apology at the state‘s level had 
ever existed. And some new strategies with typical Chinese characteristics in political 
terms were discovered.  
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Table 5: CCSs employed in the two cases 
CCSs SARS Wenchuan earthquake 
Denial Simple Denial √  
Justification 
Bolstering  √* 
Reframing √ √ 
Defeasibility  √ 
Concession 
Corrective/Proactive Works √ √ 
Compensation √ √ 
Instructive Information √ √ 
Adaptive Information  √ 
Internal Scapegoating √  
Changing Public Policies √ √ 
Diversion 
Building a New Focus √  
Showing Regards/Sympathies  √ 
Future Orientation  √ 
Fact Twisting √  
Setting Exemplary Deeds/Figures √ √ 
 
  I should lay certain special attention here to the use of sub-strategy of bolstering in 
the Wenchuan case. The central government‘s efforts on the ongoing rescue and relief 
were bolstered and pinpointed so that these efforts could be spotlighted and 
appreciated even more. This was different from stressing good traits and performance 
of the accused in the past (see page 12). First, the central government was not accused 
by the public. Second, the government was bolstering their efforts during the current 
event, not in the past. 
 
  Highlighted strategies in the bottom of Table 5 were quite typical in the mainland 
China and they were new to the category model made by Huang et al. (2005) in 
Taiwan. In the SARS crisis, facts were twisted because real figures were circulated 
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internally within the government. They were able to do so via their control on the 
mainstream media (He, 2004; Jian, n. d.). After such misdeeds were exposed, the 
central government did not create a new issue but just shifted the focus on misdeeds 
to new focuses including the importance of science and technology and the nation‘s 
fight against SARS, people‘s enemy.  
 
In the Wenchuan event, the central government gained praise from their focuses 
including openness and transparency (Zhang, 2008). And they did not plan to shift 
such focuses when they encountered critics on misdeeds like local embezzlements 
thus there was no simple denial. Instead, the central government made ambiguous 
promises, like the shoddy-built school issue, and those accused faded away from the 
public‘s attention as time went by as the government claimed that it was too 
complicated to give any conclusion (Xinhua, 2008c). Therefore, the sub-strategy of 
future orientation was found in the strategy category of Diversion.  
 
  The last new strategy of setting exemplary deeds/figures (shu dian xing) employed 
in both cases was in fact commonly used in the communication between the 
government and the public in China. Feng (2007) explained in his article that such 
strategy was about to strongly and effectively arouse, control and integrate the mass to 
serve better for the political power elites. Exemplary deeds and figures were selected, 
exposed and promoted politically to teach the mass what and how to follow. 
5.1.3 The Discourse of Renewal 
  In both cases, crisis communication was provisionally concentrated on 
government-led nation-wide corrective and proactive works. For example, a people‘s 
war was initiated in the SARS crisis and the tradition of ―one big family‖ was 
promoted and practiced in the emergent responses to the Wenchuan earthquake 
disaster. Leaderships were both effective too. Leaders at the highest level took 
charge—Wu Yi (Vice Premier) was the acting head of the anti-SARS control and 
prevention while Wen Jiabao (Premier) directed the Wenchuan rescue and relief work. 
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Both of them employed prestige and successfully dealt with crisis respectively. 
 
  Unfortunately, the discourse of renewal in crisis communication was not 
constructed successfully in any of the two cases. The central government, especially 
leaders at the highest level, did not communicate with the public pinpointing 
opportunities brought by crises. Though confidence in overcoming crisis (short-term 
future) was propagated in both cases (Hu, 2003; China, 2008e), opportunities brought 
by the two crises including updating regulations and better preparing for a next crisis 
were not officially advocated by these leaders.  
 
Nevertheless, improvements could be found in comparison. In the Wenchuan 
aftermath, the Chinese government did not work alone anymore; instead, they called 
upon and got social commitments from the public. Furthermore, while leaders at the 
highest level still paid less than enough attention to opportunity recognition in their 
crisis communication, local government brought this issue to the public when acting 
as the representative of the State Council to report rebuilding efforts.  
5.1.4 Multi-voices in Crisis Communication 
  As aforementioned, in the SARS crisis, truth was concealed and multi-voices were 
suppressed. The central government fought alone without integrating other social 
resources such as NGOs, instead of advocating for voluntary works or listening to the 
public‘s willingness to help. In other words, the central government‘s lonely voice 
dominated the crisis communication process (Peng, 2008).  
 
However, in the Wenchuan event, open communication were encouraged by the 
government and supported by modern communication technologies. Rumors like 
earthquake anticipation cover-up, aftershocks, explosion of some chemical plant in a 
water-head and reservoir‘s collapse were spread informally but the Chinese 
government fought back with timely truth communication (Zhao, 2009; Peng, 2008). 
More importantly, the grassroots became a force of monitoring governmental works 
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(Qu et al., 2009) and a flexible citizen-participating information channel (Yang, 2008; 
Yang & Liang, 2008) supplementary to the traditional media. The former 
disempowered could voice their opinions and they were no longer completely 
marginalized.  In short, abundant information was exchanged and discussed between 
the government and the public but incorrect messages like false rumors also grew 
with the freedom of communication (Peng, 2008). 
5.2 Bounded Chaos in Crises 
5.2.1 Fractals 
  Reviewing the two cases again in general, it is found that the central government 
has consistently been in a head position where direct controls and guides on crisis 
were straightly transferred from the central to the local. Power elites from the highest 
level of the government were used to provisionally take charge of the crisis 
management concerned. About the Wenchuan rescue and relief, Z. Zhou (2008) from 
the Singapore-based United Morning Post indicated that seemingly, the disaster relief 
system could not run systematically and effectively without power elites from the 
central government taking charge on the spot. Similarly, during the SARS crisis, after 
the central government decided to adopt and fulfill open and transparent crisis 
communication policies, it was the Vice Premier, Wu Yi, in power to carry out the 
SARS control and prevention work. Monitoring groups under the State Council were 
appointed to a number of regions to assure that locals were precisely enforcing 
instructions from the central government (Tsinghua & Renmin, n. d.).  
 
Additionally, in the system of so called ―democratic centralism‖ (ju guo zhi), the 
authoritarian central government centralized resources national wide and distributed 
them respectively to crisis-hit sectors and regions as quickly as possible (Ye, 2008). 
For instances, based on this centralistic system, a ―People‘s War‖ was called in the 
SARS crisis and a traditional concept of ―one big family‖ was recalled to serve the 
crisis communication after the Wenchuan earthquake. During the two crises, the 
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central government performed in a significantly effective manner concerning finance 
pooling, macro readjustments, control and administration (Cai, 2008). For example, in 
less than 45 hours, up to 100,000 soldiers, policemen and other forces had been 
pooled for the rescue and relief work in the quake-hit zone, according to Premier Wen 
Jiabao (CCTV, 2008b). It seemed that the government was an omnipotent leader 
(Chen, 2008) and when this leader instructed from the upper to the lower levels, 
everything could work effectively. Comfort et al. (2001) claimed that natural disasters 
presented ―an extraordinary difficult context for inter-organizational and 
inter-jurisdictional coordination‖ (p. 145); but in China, as long as the central 
government ordered, there was no extraordinary difficulty. 
 
Such centralized communication instructions (fractals) from top to bottom 
―naturally‖ happened in crises in a repeated way. More detailed self-repeated fractals 
about this top-to-bottom centralized crisis communication could be illustrated in 
government-controlled mass media behavior. In crisis communication, the central 
government decided what the mainstream media should report identically (He, 2004; 
Chen, 2008). When the government concealed the spread of SARS, the mass media 
then voiced little and ambiguously on the real severity of the epidemic though the 
public were anxious about the unknown disease (Jian, n. d.). When the government 
led the ―People‘s War against SARS‖, the media overstressed so much the terror of 
SARS and the necessity to fight against it that common people were fear of SARS in 
an irrational way (Li, 2006). In the Wenchuan aftermath, when the central government 
responded quickly and openly to restore a benign and credible image, the media as a 
result rushed to positively report humanitarianism and the concept of ―people-first‖ 
but they cared less than enough on negative psychological impacts they brought to 
victims when they repeatedly asked victims to recall the massive destruction (Zhou, 
2008).  
 
To conclude, crisis communication in China was decided by the authoritarian 
government. Instead of legitimated systems or social supervisions or ethics, it was 
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elites in power who decided what, how and when to say and to do to handle a crisis, 
on political purpose. In other words, the government-led crisis communication was 
repeated influenced by the authoritarian political system. When learning external 
organizations like NGOs rather than the political body (the government), it was also 
understood that crisis communication were limited by the political system. 
5.2.2 Strange Attractors 
As studied before, in the Wenchuan disaster, the central government called for 
social commitments including donation, philanthropy and voluntary work. The public 
thus responded to the central government with their commitments to earthquake-hit 
regions and victims. In reality, participation by citizens and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) as a supplementary power to the predominant governmental 
relief was of great importance to the success of anti-quake rescue and relief; and such 
participation was comparatively more mobile and flexible than the governmental one 
(Caijing, 2008; Lan, 2008).  
 
However, in the chaotic aftermath, volunteers not only contributed positively but 
also produced unexpected mess to the rescue and relief work. For example, some 
volunteers randomly brought badly-needed materials to quake-hit districts, but these 
materials could not reach those needed them most besides sometimes increased 
resource redundancies in labor and material aspects. Others enthusiastically draw to 
diastral regions but made traffic jams even worse. Quite a few volunteers arrived at 
destructive places but they were too inexperienced to contribute anything helpful (Lan, 
2008). In another case, some volunteers were not allowed to carry out their work as 
they did not get any relevant license from bureaus or associates concerned (Caijing, 
2008). In other words, positive estimations sometimes unpredictably turned to be 
negative facts. 
 
  I have to say that such failures were closely related to the authoritarian political 
philosophy and reality in China. Ding (2008) pointed out from the angle of legitimacy 
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that, in practice, the government‘s recognition to NGOs and trainings on volunteers 
were too little to meet urgent needs in disasters though relevant national regulations 
had called for organizing well-prepared volunteer groups. The Chinese government 
actually left little room and few channel for NGOs and volunteers in their emergency 
response system when disasters really happened (Lan, 2008). More fundamentally, Jia, 
head of the NGO Research Center in Tsinghua University, unveiled that such 
unexpected dilemmas were due to current governmental system because the Chinese 
government was still pretty cautious about the degree of freedom owned by citizens 
and they carefully watched all powers out of governmental system (Caijing, 2008). 
For a long time, Chinese NGOs had been looking for recognition and appreciation 
from the government, but ―the information was always mismatched and the 
government did not understand us‖, according to some volunteer from a Chinese 
NGO (Caijing, 2008). 
5.2.3 Self-organization 
  New stability is always born from chaos and an upgraded order is newly emerged. 
A chaotic period could be ―necessary for a new adaptive stability to be achieved‖ (Bü
tz, 1997, p. 14). In the case by case studies before, it is quite obvious that upgraded 
orders have been emerged after crises. In late April, 2003, Gao Qiang, leader of the 
Ministry of Health (MoH), admitted during the SARS crisis that the work of the MoH 
was imperfect and relatively weak (Xinhua, 2003a). After the government decided to 
strongly fight against SARS, in mid May, 2003, the State Council approved the 
Regulation on the Urgent Handling of Public Health Emergencies to deal with SARS 
and other urgent cases in the future (GOV, 2003). The establishment of China‘s 
response system to public health emergencies started from then on. In the aftermath of 
the Wenchuan earthquake, on May 15, 2008, the MoH introduced their urgent 
responses to this disaster from national pooling of medical workers and necessities to 
infectious disease control and prevention. As they promised, no disease broke out in 
the destructive region. Similar system upgrades due to the Wenchuan earthquake also 
happened (State Council, 2008c). The Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
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Precautions against Earthquakes and Relief of Disaster was revised and approved in 
December 2008 (Xinhua, 2008b). Without the earthquake in 2008, the previous 
outdated one established in 1997 might still hold its position till some day a second 
disaster occurred.  
 
The Wenchuan earthquake also offered an opportunity for cooperation and 
coordination between the government and the public, as aforementioned. From the 
cross-case comparison, it was understood that such mutual commitments were an 
obvious improvement in multi-voices and discourse of renewal for crisis 
communication. However, from the NGO and volunteer case, it was learned that such 
cooperation was bounded by systematic limits (Caijing, 2008). In a workshop 
synthesis organized by the UN and the Ministry of Commerce of China (2008), NGOs 
and grassroots organizations gained a position in the reconstruction structure and 
management system. Nevertheless, in the Overall Planning for Post-Wenchuan 
Earthquake Restoration and Reconstruction (State Council, 2008d), the word 
―volunteers‖ only appeared in one sentence—―…provide dormitories for temporary 
cadres, volunteers for education and medical care, etc.‖ (p. 45).  
 
In whatever case, it was always true that new orders were confirmed in order to 
deal with current chaos and handle some unexpected similar crisis in the future. All 
updates in the three instances were forms of self-organization that permanently 
supplant the country‘s previous emergency response systems and rules. New orders 
were solidified and suited much better than the previous ones (Kauffman, 1993) to 
respond to needs of the nation and the people, but limited by political bounds. 
5.3 Summary of Cross-case Comparison 
  It was found that the central government did a better work in the Wenchuan case by 
telling the truth quickly and comprehensively. A series of crisis communicative 
strategies were compared to show how differently the government behaved in the two 
cases. Multi-voices from the public were also better adopted by the central 
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government. However, the government successively failed in creating a discourse of 
renewal in the aftermath of crisis and fully seizing opportunities. By studying 
self-repeated governmental behavior, unexpected results made by implicit rules and 
national policy changes, it is understood that the authoritarian political system might 
possibly bound such aspects as governmental practices, mutual commitments and 
upgrades of policies and regulations. 
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6. Conclusion 
  The thesis presented attribution theory to illustrate how responsibility was 
attributed to actors, especially the accused, in a crisis. Crisis types and performance 
history were specially spotlighted in the responsibility attribution and the importance 
of reputation was then highlighted. Later, crisis communicative strategies relating to 
reputation and image restoration were explained through Huang et al. (2005)‘s model 
which contained an emphasis on a Chinese context. The discourse of renewal was 
added to stress that a crisis brought damages but it could also give birth to 
opportunities. Theory about multi-voices in crisis communication was introduced 
because at least two parties (the government and the public) were interacting with 
each other in crisis communication. Thus it would be better to include what reactions 
the public had than to just unilaterally examine what the government did. Chaos 
theory was added to explain that examinations on crisis communication should not 
limit on an organizational/governmental level and attentions should be paid to a broad 
extent where the crisis happened and actors (both parties) were involved in. Looking 
at more than one crisis over a long time was useful to discover implicit bounded 
patterns and principles, according to chaos theory.  
 
Therefore, in the two separate case studies, strategies, multi-voices and discourse of 
renewal in crisis communication carried out by the central government of China were 
all analyzed one by one. Interestingly, it was learned that in China, the central 
government used such strategies as fact twisting which offered false information to 
the public; future orientation which contained ambiguous promises and building a 
new focus which shifted the public‘ focus from the misdeed to another in the same 
issue. Multi-voices once were suppressed in the SARS crisis but it seemed that they 
were allowed in the Wenchuan event. In the SARS crisis, the government worked 
hard but alone to eliminate the disease while in the Wenchuan event, they called and 
utilized citizens‘ commitments. However, the central government failed to establish a 
discourse of renewal in the two cases because leaders at the highest level usually 
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omitted emphasis on opportunities brought by crisis. 
 
Self-repeated patterns (fractals), unexpected result produced by certain principles 
(strange attractors) and self-upgrade on rules and systems (self-organization) during 
and after a crisis event were all discussed in the cross-case comparison. The central 
government usually centralized nation-wide resources to manage crisis and they 
always powerfully directed crisis communication. Participation of NGOs and 
volunteers was constrained and this could be counted as negative effects of the 
governmental system. Governmental policies were usually upgraded in post-crisis 
periods and such improvements might reduce loss in a next crisis in the future. Crises 
enabled some disorganized systems to ―spontaneously solidify into a higher degree of 
order‖ (Sellnow, et al. 2002: p. 272) in the chaotic environment. In short, when 
studying crisis communication in a cross-case manner, it was found that the 
authoritarian politics in China influenced the governmental crisis communication 
practices and changes. As Huang (2004) criticized, the pattern of the Chinese 
government‘s response was ―shaped by the institutional dynamics of the country‘s 
political system‖ (p. 130).   
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7. Discussion 
  In this thesis, the central government of China was chosen as the main actor to 
analyze crisis communication in the SARS crisis and the Wenchuan earthquake 
because the central government kept playing a predominant role in the 
communication process due to authoritarianism and the traditional orientation of 
omnipotent government in China (Chen, 2008). Accordingly, news reports were 
selected mostly from government-controlled propaganda representatives (main news 
agencies) to study how the government communicated with the public during and 
after crises. Case studies were fulfilled in a pattern-matching way (Yin, 2009), based 
on the theoretical part.  
 
This thesis was a good start trying to examine how much western crisis 
communication theories were relevant in a Chinese context by studying specific 
practices such as crisis communicative strategies, the discourse of renewal and the 
public‘s multi-voices which interacted with communication practices from the central 
government. Additionally, guided by chaos theory, crisis communication in the two 
cases was studied with a broader view over an extended time to find rules which 
bounded crisis communication practices.  
 
  As aforementioned, the study here was limited in the sense that the presented crisis 
communication practices were mainly from governmental propaganda. Such 
concentration on information sources, on one hand, enabled me to examine 
governmental reactions to a specific extent; on the other hand, meant that study here 
were limited and some facts might be ignored.  
 
Future research could alternatively examine crisis communication practices from 
some other aspects through information from other agencies, for example, 
governmental reactions reported by international news agencies. Information from 
other actors like volunteers, victims and specific local governments could be collected 
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as well to review what crisis communication by the government, from different angles. 
Studying on why the Chinese government could overcome a crisis without 
apologizing for their misdeeds might be also interesting. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix One: The Crisis Communicative Strategies (CCSs) in the 
SARS crisis 
--Summary based on the chronology in the SARS-special web co-run by Tsinghua 
University and Renmin University 
 
CCS types and 
definitions 
Practices 
Simple denial: no 
severe spread of 
SARS. 
Zhang Wenkang (Minister of Health) strongly confirmed that it 
was safe to travel and stay in China (03/04). 
Top leader in the National Tourism Administration claimed that 
no tourist in China was infected by SARS (04/04). 
Fact twisting: 
admitted SARS‘ 
spread but shrank 
the severity to a 
much smaller scale 
Zhang revealed in his interview with CCTV that the total 
probable SARS cases in China reached 1190 but 934 of them 
recovered already, while 46 of the 1190 died (02/04). 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) announced that the SARS 
probable cases in the mainland China reached 1435 and 64 of 
them died (14/04). 
Reframing: 
reframed the facets 
in a larger and 
more favorable 
context 
Deputy minister of the MoH (Gao qiang) officially admitted that 
imperfections and weak links existed in the work of the MoH 
and probable case number was corrected from 1435 into 1807 
(20/04). 
Compensation: 
compensated 
victims with 
money, goods and 
services to fight 
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) established the SARS 
Prevention and Cure Fund and distributed additional funds for 
constructions of central and regional centers for disease control 
and prevention (23/04). 
Personnel from the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
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against SARS and 
to counter off their 
loss 
confirmed that the insured affected by SARS could claim for 
insurance according to corresponding policy terms (24/04). 
The MoF and the MoH regulated that SARS-infected peasants 
and low-income groups should have medical treatments for free, 
paid by the government (29/04). 
The MoF and the State Administration of Taxation reduced 
taxes on industries heavily affected by SARS (10, 11/05). 
Corrective or 
proactive works: 
repaired damages 
and restored the 
image; prevented a 
repeat or spread of 
the crisis 
The Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CCDC) published online The Preliminary Plan for SARS 
Control and Prevention (01/04) 
The prevention and control of SARS was seriously considered 
by the highest level as ―the very important among those 
important‖ in the hygiene work (02/04).  
The CCDC found and published 7 depressants against SARS 
(04/04) 
The MoH set up 8 cooperating groups for the SARS prevention 
and control (07/04) 
A press conference was held to introduce China‘s work on the 
SARS prevention and control (10/04). 
Various related state-level and regional departments were 
required to strictly prevent any further spread of SARS via any 
transportation means (12/04). 
Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized that fighting against SARS was 
directly related to 1) the physical health and life safety of the 
public; 2) the stable macro environment of the development of 
China‘s opening and reforming; and 3) the nation‘s interest and 
international image (13/04). President Hu Jintao double 
confirmed Primer Wen‘s words on the next day (14/04). 
Related state and regional departments and units were required 
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to prepare well for medicine production, storage and supply in 
the market to prevent the SARS spread (17, 18/04). 
The State Administration of Industry and Commerce instructed 
various levels of administration units to prevent and punish 
illegal or irregular market activities under the name of the SARS 
prevention and control (19/04). 
The MoH set up two additional cooperating groups to monitor 
and guarantee the SARS prevention and control work (21/04). 
The SARS Control and Prevention Headquarter in the State 
Council was set up with the vice Premier Wu Yi as the director 
(23/04). 
The Ministry of Education instructed schools to cancel mid-term 
exams and simplify final semester exams as much as possible 
(23/04). 
The State Bureau of Medical Supervision announced that a new 
drug spray was approved and under test for SARS (24/04). 
Medical institutions were required to simplify procedures for 
treatments to SARS-infected patients (30/04).  
Changing public 
policy: altered the 
government‘s 
policies 
Four principles were established in a State Council Executive 
Committee meeting to upgrade the immediate national response 
system to emergent public hygiene crisis (14/04). 
SARS was included in the category of regulatory infective 
diseases management by the MoH (14/04).  
The State Council published the Regulation on the Urgent 
Handling of Public Health Emergencies (12/05) 
Instructive 
information: taught 
people to react to 
the crisis 
The MoH published recommended remedies for SARS and 
reference standards for diagnoses confirmation (06/04). 
A CDCC representative answered the most concerned questions 
on SARS prevention and control (07/04). 
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Related personnel explained the Law on the Prevention and 
Treatment of Infectious Diseases in the interview from the 
Xinhua News Agency (29/04). 
The MoH instructed procedures and methods to track and 
quarantine people in close touch with SARS-infected patients 
(01/05). 
The MoH published The SARS Prevention and Treatment 
Procedure (14/05).  
Internal 
scapegoating: 
claimed that only 
some people in the 
government made 
mistakes. 
The Minister of MoH (Zhang) and the Beijing Mayor (Meng) 
were dismissed for mismanagement in the SARS prevention and 
control (20/04).  
Building a new 
focus: reduced 
publics‘ focus on 
political misdeeds 
by creating new 
focuses on SARS 
prevention and 
control. 
President Hu Jintao emphasized the vital key role of science and 
technology in the SARS prevention and control (20/04). 
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Appendix Two: The Crisis Communicative Strategies (CCSs) in 
the Wenchuan Earthquake 
--summary from press conferences held by the State Council in the first two weeks 
after the Wenchuan earthquake 
 
 
CCSs types and 
definitions 
Practices 
Defeasibility: 
claimed that the 
government was 
constrained to do 
better by external 
and uncontrollable 
factors 
The difficulty of quake anticipation was emphasized to 
counter off the rumor of ―concealing the quake anticipation in 
order to insure the stability for the coming Olympics Games‖. 
Cautiousness and road blocks were stressed. 
The difficulty of transporting professional gigantic equipments 
due to road blocks was explained when the military was 
questioned on their inefficiency and poor relief equipments 
though their efforts were appreciated. 
Reframing: 
described the 
government‘s work 
limits in a larger and 
more favorable 
context 
When criticized on the safety and quality of school buildings, 
damages of governmental buildings, student-focus media 
reports and relief and the unprecedented severity of the 
earthquake were all emphasized to explain that such critics did 
not use appropriate standards. 
The central government‘s reluctance on accepting foreign 
relief groups was due to the almost blocked transportations.  
When asked about the possible human-induced downgrade of 
building quality, it was claimed that every country and every 
one concerns on qualities of buildings and facilities. 
When asked if China had its own professional and specific 
forces for disaster relief instead of relying on the military 
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forces, it was answered that the Army had been well equipped 
and trained for disaster relief purpose 
Compensation: 
compensated victims 
with money, goods 
and services to 
handle the 
post-quake 
difficulties 
It was clearly confirmed that the government would be 
responsible to give sufficient treatments including dealing 
with corpses. 
No additional burden would be loaded to victims for medical 
treatments they got from the government. 
Changing the 
government‘s 
policies 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Precautions 
against Earthquakes and Relief of Disaster was revised and 
approved in December, 2008. 
Adaptive 
information: 
interfered the 
psychological impact 
of the quake on 
people 
Doctors for mental guidance were included in the disaster 
emergent relief and mental rehabilitation plan would be 
carried out in the long run. 
Placatory mental interventions were carried out. 
Post-quake house safety were tested on the spot by 
professionals to assure residents safe shelters to live in. 
Setting exemplary 
figures/deeds: 
established models 
for common people 
to follow 
Medical workers from Guangdong and Chongqing walked to 
Wenchuan for rescue relief work when other transportation 
means were limited. 
Soldiers struggled for forty hours plus to dig out an 
11-year-old girl. 
Soldiers parachuted without precise weather information or 
ground guides in order to penetrate in certain deadly-blocked 
mountainous areas. 
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Showing Regards / 
Sympathy 
The government felt heart-broken for injuries and deaths of 
students. However, qualifies of school building should under 
future investigation to see. 
Future orientation: 
promised that 
changes would be 
done in the unknown 
future. (the accused 
act was not 
confirmed as real) 
Any possible jerry-built houses and schools would be 
followed, examined and tracked; people in charge concerned 
would be punished if misdeeds were confirmed through 
investigations. 
 
